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Abstract 
This paper narrates the story of Red Orient (Rus. Krasnyi Vostok; Uz. Qizil 
Sharq) textile trust (trest). This trust was initially owned by the Bukharan 
People’s Republic, then, after the national delimitation of Central Asia, by the 
Uzbek SSR. Its activity included all the steps of the added-value chain of 
industrial transformation of ginned cotton (spinning, twisting, dyeing, finishing, 
weaving, and printing). Its factories and mills, initially all located in Russia, 
served as a training ground for the first generation of native Uzbek textile 
workers while its management participated in the planning and construction of 
the first cotton textile plant in Fergana towards the end of the decade.  
 
Two threads are entangled in this story: first, the day-by-day workings of the New 
Economic Policy in a small industrial organization; second, the economic side of 
early Soviet nationality policies. This paper looks at the nitty-gritty aspects of 
procurements, bookkeeping, audit, and management. It shows how balance 
sheets were more an item for negotiation and a political weapon, than a 
diagnostic tool for the efficiency of Red Orient’s business. Above all, the story of 
Red Orient reveals that early Soviet economic policies did not exclude that the 
Central Asian cotton harvest could be processed by mills owned by the republics 
themselves, and result in finished textiles for the Central Asian market. The 
Bukharan (later, Uzbek) governments, either directly or through their 
representatives in Moscow, confronted all-Union agencies in the name of the 
“national” nature of the trust, be it to settle complicated debt relations, to reshape 
the procurement of raw materials, to acquire additional looms and, ultimately, to 
negotiate the construction of the first textile factory in Fergana. In other words, 
the republics, as shareholders and eponymous “nations” of the trust, took 
ownership of its destiny and day-to-day trade and production activities. 
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The Hunt for Red Orient 
A Soviet Industrial trest Between Moscow and Bukhara (1922-1929)1 
 
 
Communism created ultimately effective 
aesthetic structures and ultimately defective 
economic ones … Factories are not built to 
produce commodities. They produce the 
united-working-class-body. They are 
allegorical figures of industrialization. 
Industry represents the leading metaphor of 
party ideology and factories are the works of 
this ideology. They result in a deficit of goods, 
but an overproduction of meanings … They 




In 2013-2014, Uzbekistan was the world’s sixth largest producer and the fifth 
largest exporter of cotton.3 This means that its domestic textile industry absorbed 
only little more than one-fifth of the raw cotton harvested in the republic or, 
more exactly, of the lint obtained from that raw cotton. In January 2005, the 
Uzbek government launched a “Programme for the Development of the Textile 
Industry” to increase the percentage of domestic cotton processed in Uzbekistani 
mills, but since then this ratio seems to have increased more because the cotton 
harvests (the denominator) have shrunk than because of the modest increase in 
the output of textiles.4 On a different scale, this focus on the “export” of ginned 
cotton, excluding its further transformation into yarn or fabric, also existed 
before Uzbek independence, when Soviet all-Union planning was in place. We 
know comparatively much less about the consumption of Central Asian cotton by 
local textile producers in the Tsarist and early Soviet periods.5 
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Historians and social scientists, both in the former Soviet Union and in the 
West, have focused on the emergence, consolidation, and sustainability (or lack 
thereof) of the cultivation of cotton in Central Asia. The available literature on 
this and related topics (irrigation, labor, ginning, and so on) is extensive, albeit of 
mixed quality.6 By comparison, the history of industrial development (and, in 
particular, of the textile sector) in this part of the world is an unexplored field. 
Local scholars have produced a large number of short articles on this or that 
plant or, more often, on the industrialization of individual districts, but much of 
it does not go beyond the eulogy of Soviet achievements and the heroism of 
factory workers.7 While it would be imprudent to dismiss all this literature in 
bulk, it remains true that the history of the textile sector (and industry as a 
whole) in Soviet Central Asia would greatly benefit from a “revisionist” approach, 
similar to that which has transformed our views about Soviet nationality policies, 
collective agriculture, and sedentarization in recent years.8 
In this untrodden field, a particularly interesting point is the nexus 
between the local production of raw materials and their subsequent 
transformation in Central Asia itself. If “history matters” in the determination of 
paths of economic development, as researchers seem now to agree, it is necessary 
to explain how and why (but, above all, when and to what extent) Central Asia 
became an exporter of raw materials while failing to develop its own 
manufacturing industries. This is a challenging research agenda and requires a 
reappraisal of local industries in the Tsarist period, as well as a thorough 
reconstruction of the region’s trade with neighboring regions, especially South 
Asia and the Indian subcontinent. The received idea that Russian rule brought 
about the de-industrialization of Central Asia, which has until now gone 
unchallenged, deserves a careful re-examination – and, potentially, refutation. 
Not only would this enhance our knowledge of regional history, but it would also 
open up the possibility of interesting comparisons with the (real or supposed) de-
industrialization of the Indian subcontinent9 and of the cotton-producing areas of 
the Ottoman empire.10 
This paper offers a contribution to the debate about why and when Central 
Asia, and Uzbekistan in particular, specialized in the export, rather than the 
processing and manufacture, of raw cotton, by looking at one crucial juncture in 
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time and, more importantly, by examining what seems at first like a deviation or 
exception to this development path. The Bukharan People’s Republic and, from 
1925, the Uzbek SSR possessed and managed, first as majority and then as the 
sole shareholder, a textile company (trest), named Red Orient (Rus. Krasnyi 
Vostok; Uz. Qizil Sharq). This trust included all the steps of the added-value 
chain of industrial transformation of ginned cotton, including spinning, twisting, 
dyeing, finishing, weaving, and printing. Its factories and mills, initially all 
located in Russia, served as a training ground for the first generation of native 
Uzbek textile workers while its management participated in the planning and 
construction of the first cotton textile plant in Fergana towards the end of the 
decade.11 
While nobody at the time questioned the role of the Uzbek SSR as a major 
producer of raw cotton, the story of Red Orient shows that this choice did not 
exclude the development of the local textile industry. The possibility that part of 
their cotton harvest should be processed by mills owned by the republics 
themselves, and result in finished textiles for the Central Asian market, became 
viable. Even though these requests were not always successful, both Bukharan 
(then Uzbek) and Moscow-based organs considered them legitimate arguments 
in the negotiation process that shaped industrial planning and trade policies. 
While the management, cadres, and, very likely, the majority of the workers of 
Red Orient’s factories were Russian or European, the Bukharan (later, Uzbek) 
governments, either directly or through their permanent representatives in 
Moscow, confronted all-Union agencies in the name of the “national” nature of 
the trust, be it to settle complicated debt relations, to reshape the procurement of 
raw materials, or to acquire additional looms. The managers of the mills were not 
Bukharan, but it was the Bukharan council of nazirs that ultimately obtained the 
dismissal of managers they were not happy with. In other words, the republics, as 
shareholders and eponymous “nations” of the trust, took ownership of its destiny 
and day-to-day trade and production activities. Such an engagement was neither 
ignored nor systematically opposed by all-Union political institutions; if 
anything, it was encouraged, as long as the VSNKh did not press for increased 
centralization and planning. All in all, the vicissitudes of Red Orient show that, in 
the early years of Soviet rule, alternative paths for the economic development of 
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the Central Asian republics were at least thinkable. Rather than tracking 
theoretical and political debates on this matter, this paper explores how the 
practical activity of Red Orient and its plants up until 1930 echoed them, 
although from a remote distance. 
When we adopt this angle of observation and embrace a micro-historical 
approach, the hunt for Red Orient through various archives and published 
sources becomes a way of engaging with an array of other issues. The story of this 
trest intersects with the larger history of early Soviet nationality policy, but also 
with that of the “New Economic Policy” (NEP) in its nitty-gritty aspects of 
bookkeeping, audit, management, and the overall struggle for efficiency. In other 
words, this paper looks at Red Orient from the viewpoint of the conventional 
political history of the Soviet “national” periphery, but it also attempts to 
approach its activity from the angle of business history. Red Orient as a 
“national” enterprise and Red Orient as a business organization under NEP were 
the same thing in real life; only the historian can disentangle and reconstruct 
these two aspects ex post. Such an intellectual operation would nonetheless 
sacrifice the imbrication between the “national-political” and “industrial-
business” dimensions of the life of Red Orient, which constitutes its most 
significant and distinctive feature. It is therefore preferable to narrate the story 
of Red Orient and, through this narration, tease out the wider significance of its 
most crucial episodes.  
From the standpoint of the student of Soviet history, Red Orient is an 
almost unknown episode in the relations between Moscow and the political 
entities that sprang up in Central Asia in the aftermath of the 1917 revolutions. Its 
story starts with an agreement between Russia (the RSFSR) and Bukhara 
(BNSR), and it continues with the tense relations between the all-Union level of 
power and an individual Soviet republic (the Uzbek SSR); between and below 
them, this story involves the organs governing Moscow and its hinterland and – 
more significantly – the regional level, represented most typically by the party’s 
Central Asian Bureau. What emerges is the complexity of the relations between 
“center” and “periphery”: the latter were shaped not only by legislation and 
administrative or Party decisions, but also by personal networks and the physical 
mobility of some minor figures between Bukhara, Tashkent, and Moscow. More 
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broadly, this study shows the often overlooked importance of the economic 
provisions embedded in Bolshevik nationalities policy. Besides borders, 
alphabets, and “quotas” in the Party and Soviet apparatus, these policies included 
issues of investments, shareholding, and transfer of industrial assets. Finally, Red 
Orient reminds us of the variety and limits of early Soviet “nativization” 
(korenizatsiia) policies: the trest and its factories were a training ground for 
workers and a handful of Central Asian decision-makers who could experiment 
(or toy with?) industrial management in a context that remained, however, 
largely dominated by Europeans.12 In this respect, the importance of Red Orient 
(and of similar companies) was much greater than the small number of its 
spindles or “native” workers would suggest. These factories were, as Todorov says 
in the epigraph to this introduction, “allegorical figures of industrialization” and 
therefore worth fighting for if one wanted to cultivate the idea that the Uzbek SSR 
should have its share in industrial socialist development. 
The story of Red Orient is also a vantage point for the microscopic 
observation of dynamics characteristic of the NEP era. In this respect, this study 
integrates an abundant historiography that has focused on this period as a whole, 
or, more specifically, on the cotton sector.13 As evident in the next sections, 
looking at a single trust opens interesting perspectives on the day-to-day 
difficulties of industrial production in the early NEP years, such as obstacles in 
procuring raw materials and fuel. It also shows what (bad) Soviet managers 
might look like, what they were accused of, and how they tried to defend 
themselves with political arguments in the heyday of the move towards the 
“intensification” of factory work. While khozraschët (“the application of 
commercial principles to industry in order to guarantee efficiency and sensitivity 
to the market”) 14  was a prominent feature of the NEP and scholarship has 
commented on the work of the Workers-Peasants’ Inspection (Rabkrin) in 
controlling accounting and management,15 documents from Red Orient show 
how both bookkeeping and auditing were more objects of negotiation than 
neutral tools for regulating economic mores. Another keyword of the NEP, the 
alliance between factory and country (smychka), advocated by Bukharin until his 
downfall, receives an interesting twist if regarded from the perspective of the 
Bukharan and Uzbek stakeholders of Red Orient. Their goal was not just to 
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strengthen the ties between workers and peasants by means of what Trotsky 
dubbed “an endless ribbon of cloth,”16 but to link the metropole and the Central 
Asian countryside by letting Uzbek cotton-growing households purchase cloth 
woven from the very cotton they had handed over to the Soviet procurement 
agency. In Red Orient, the smychka could have acquired, at least symbolically, an 
anti-colonial shade: Uzbek cotton could be processed by an Uzbek plant for the 
Uzbek market, rather than being conflated with other sources into the cauldron 
of pan-Soviet production plans. All in all, the story of Red Orient adds to the 
complexity of the industrial world of the 1920s. Recent Russian historiography on 
the NEP has insisted on its “multi-layered” character (mnogoukladnaia 
ekonomika) because it combined a variety of enterprises, defined first on the 
basis of the ownership of the means of production (State, private, co-operative) 
and then on the basis of other criteria (dimension, combination of one or more of 
the types above).17 This paper emphasizes the importance of a further variable: 
the explicit or hidden “national” character of some of the NEP trusts, which 
shaped their relations to institutions and other economic actors both in the 
“metropole” and at the “periphery.” 
Using these two red threads, this paper follows the zigzags of Red Orient 
from its establishment to the first five-year plan. Section 2 clarifies Red Orient's 
historical background, focusing on the Central Asian cotton sector and the 
establishment of Soviet rule in the region, as well as the institutional context of 
the New Economic Policy in which this trust started operating. Section 3 
discusses how wider Bolshevik nationalities policy included the transfer of 
factories to the Bukharan People’s Republic and how the original “national” 
nature of Red Orient shaped its relations with other economic organizations, 
both in the “center” and at the periphery. Until the national delimitation and the 
transfer to the Uzbek SSR, the business life of Red Orient reflected both internal 
management problems and tense relations with its Bukharan stakeholders, as 
explained in Section 4. An analogous blend of political motives and technical 
assessment marked the results of the audit which the Peasants’ and Workers’ 
Inspection (Rabkrin) carried out in 1925. Section 5 demonstrates how, once 
transferred to the Uzbek SSR and with a new industrial plan, Red Orient’s 
“national” nature became visible in the attempt to establish a more direct link 
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with the republic, both for the supply of raw materials to its mills in Russia and 
for the provision of the Central Asian market (which could have led to the 
expansion of the weaving sector of the trust). In Section 6, under the first five-
year plan, Red Orient metamorphoses into something rather different, but not 
totally incompatible with the original intentions which both Bukhara and 
Moscow had expressed on the occasion of its foundation: the experience 
accumulated by Red Orient served as a basis for the establishment of the first 
cotton textile factory in the Uzbek SSR itself. While we will mostly proceed 
chronologically, sometimes it will be necessary to look at Red Orient from 
specific viewpoints, such as the provision of raw materials, the role of its 
managers, its relations with other trusts, or even the nuts and bolts of its balance 
sheets. Conclusions, as well as some suggestions for future research, appear in 
Section 7. This paper addresses itself to a large and diverse audience and, hence, 
sometimes explains what may be obvious to some readers but vital to others. This 
is an intrinsic limit of such an exploratory work. 
 
2. The setting: cotton and revolution.  
The Russian empire's conquest of Central Asia conventionally begins with the fall 
of the Kokandi fortress of Aq-Masjid (modern Kyzyl-Orda, in Kazakhstan) in 
1853. It would take two more decades, however, before the newly conquered 
territory, which by then included the whole of the Syr-Darya valley and 
Samarkand, acquired the institutional shape it would retain until the Bolshevik 
revolution. The territory of the Turkestan general-governorship was ruled from 
Tashkent while the shrunken territories of the Bukharan emirate and Khivan 
khanate became Russian protectorates. While local short-staple cotton (ghuza) 
was not unknown before the conquest, it was only under Russian imperial rule 
that cotton, this time in the form of American long-staple varieties, became a 
prominent part of the crop mix. By shaping the natural and social landscape of 
the region since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the history of the 
cotton boom has been linked to the economic, social, and environmental history 
of Central Asia in the scholarly and non-scholarly imagination. The epochal 
importance of the pre-revolutionary “cotton boom” cannot be denied, nor the fact 
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that the main industrial activity in colonial Central Asia was the ginning of raw 
cotton, rather than its further transformation in local textile mills. It is the 
absence of a modern local textile industry, and even more the Soviet and post-
Soviet ideological construction that surrounded such supposed absence, that 
makes the establishment of a Bukharan textile trust so intriguing from the 
historian’s viewpoint. Yet the background of the birth of Red Orient is also made 
up of the institutional and political change that overtook Central Asia in the years 
of the revolution and civil war (which led to the establishment of the Bukharan 
People’s Republic) and of the specificities of the New Economic Policy for the 
cotton sector in general. 
 
2.1 Central Asian cotton under Russian rule 
The best known development in the economy of pre-revolutionary Turkestan is 
the boom in the cultivation and first transformation (ginning) of cotton. 18 
Between the early 1890s and the First World War, the acreage under cotton 
increased spectacularly, and the output with it, although with some stops and 
starts. In an attempt to recall briefly the phases of such a development, we would 
mention here that “native” cotton (ghuza, Gossypium herbaceum) had been part 
of the crop mix in the khanates and emirate well before the conquest. As the 
Russians realized in the 1860s, when the unavailability of US cotton during the 
civil war boosted their Central Asian imports, ghuza was a short-staple variety, 
scarcely suitable for modern mechanical spinning. Hence, once Turkestan had 
been conquered, some private entrepreneurs and a few Russian officers, 
including the first governor-general, distributed the seeds of American cotton. 
After some unsuccessful experiences with the Sea Island variety, in the 1880s it 
began to be clear that Upland American cotton could give good yields in the local 
conditions. The potential for easy and quick gains led to the so-called “cotton 
fever” of the 1880s (khlopkovaia likhoradka). In this first phase, the cultivation 
and first transformation (ginning) of cotton revolved around Tashkent; many, 
though not all, of those who invested in this new business were Russian or 
European, sometimes with little or no farming experience. They rented relatively 
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large plots from the Muslim population and hired native sharecroppers to grow 
cotton on it.  
 This first phase did not last very long. By the beginning of the 1890s, only 
a few of the companies that had invested in cotton during the “fever” had 
resisted; others had disappeared or gone bankrupt and been absorbed by 
someone else. The “plantation model” in particular had failed. By comparison, 
smallholdings, where native peasant households were growing American cotton, 
were faring much better. The center of cotton production shifted from Tashkent 
to the Fergana valley where more and more land became cultivated under cotton 
while other irrigated crops shrank, as did the fallow land. One could look at the 
cotton boom, hypothetically, as a way to overcome the increasing ecological 
constraints the native population faced: the scarcity of irrigated land and water 
resources, demographic expansion, and the growing difficulty of finding enough 
fallow land to support draught animals for agriculture. Cotton promised to be a 
breakthrough crop: its price was high (and even higher in Russia because of 
custom duties on imports), it was a labor-intensive crop, and labor was fairly 
cheap, at least at the beginning of this process. Provided that relatively 
inexpensive grain could be imported from elsewhere in Central Asia (the Syr-
Darya basin north and east of Tashkent, Semirechie, eastern Bukhara), the choice 
to grow cotton was anything but irrational or coerced. The arrival of the 
Transcaspian (then Central Asian) railway line at Andijan (in the easternmost 
part of Fergana) and the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent railway, which 
was completed in 1906, were essential to satisfy the growing local demand for 
cheap grain and other products, including manufacture. In addition, in 1891, the 
Russian administration started to grant a significant tax break to villages where 
American cotton was grown.19 
 Conventional accounts of the pre-revolutionary economy of the region 
point to growing inequality as a consequence of this process.20 An unknown 
percentage of smallholders became indebted and planted cotton because it was 
the crop that gave them more chance to pay back their dues, but, to do this, they 
had to accept advances on seeds from Russian companies and local 
intermediaries. Indebted peasants sometimes became insolvent and had to 
surrender their land.21 While there is a general consensus around the increase of 
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social inequality in Turkestan on the eve of World War 1, this inequality has never 
been systematically measured. One cannot deny the presence of severe tensions 
in some parts of the countryside, but Soviet historians were looking for such an 
increasing inequality because they needed to prove the existence of “social 
stratification” (a necessary precondition for revolution), and this casts legitimate 
doubts about this narrative. Many other basic pieces of information about the 
economy of pre-revolutionary Turkestan remain obscure – most notably, the 
total GDP of the region and the GDP per capita. 
 As a result, historians have expressed mixed judgments on the economic 
consequences of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. Soviet historiography 
alternates the enumeration of its positive effects (the “objectively progressive” 
consequences of the development of capitalism and the political influence of the 
Russian proletariat) with the deprecation of “colonial rule.” Outside the USSR, at 
least until the 1990s, the interpretive paradigm known as “Sovietology” saw this 
country as a “prison of peoples” where Muslim nationalities were particularly 
disgruntled. 22  Henceforth, post-Soviet revisionist scholarship has been 
concerned, above all, with the history and anthropology of Islamic practices, 
beliefs, and intellectual history. Unfortunately, as far as the social and economic 
history of the region are concerned, historians still rely predominantly on Soviet 
scholarship. One of the consequences of this reliance is the focus on public 
investments, on regulations, and, more generally, on what Soviet writers 
identified as the collusion between monopolistic capitalism and Russian 
autocracy.23 
 The sub-field of business history is somewhat more populated. Possibly 
because of a political urge to emphasize the importance of a tradition of local 
entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan, dissertations and publications on the birth and 
growth of individual sectors (banking, oil, etc.) have appeared. In-depth studies 
of a single company or factory, which were the first fruits of business 
historiography in Europe and in the US, are not represented in the recent 
scholarship of the Uzbek republic, possibly as a reaction against the Soviet-style 
eulogy of single plants, organizations, or farms. In many cases, the existing 
studies do not focus on business as such (i.e., as an economic activity that creates 
income through the mobilization of labor and capital) but rather on the relation 
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between business and, for instance, the development of “Jadidism” (the local 
Islamic “reformism” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century which has 
dominated the agenda of Uzbekistani scholarship for quite a few years now)24 or 
the lives of specific groups (e.g., Bukharan Jews). Only very recently have 
historians produced tentative, albeit sweeping, overviews of the activity of private 
native and Russian companies in pre-revolutionary Turkestan, with a focus on 
legal questions.25 
2.2 The “continuum of crisis” in Central Asia (1914-1924) 
Typical research questions in mainstream economic history tend to be 
counterfactual. In our case, the fundamental question is what would have 
happened to Central Asia and, more specifically, to Russian Turkestan if the 
Bolshevik revolution had not occurred. This general question can be specified in 
different ways. For instance, would Central Asia have continued to follow the 
same pattern of development, based on the export of low added-value products 
and raw materials (e.g., cotton and minerals), or would it have developed its own 
transformation industry? Were the seeds of such a transformation already there, 
before the revolution nipped them in the bud? How would this change have 
occurred? Would the “cotton bubble” have finally burst, as some observers had 
forecast since the 1890s? Was the Bolshevik regime indispensable to ensure the 
survival of a system of economic relations that had become short of breath by 
WWI? Given the present dearth of quantitatively-minded inquiries on the pre-
revolutionary economy of the region and the ignorance (or neglect) of the 
region’s peculiarities by the few economists who have tried this exercise,26 it is 
still impossible to answer. It might be useful, however, to recall how Russian 
Turkestan and the two protectorates “transited” and transformed themselves 
between 1914 and 1924. This should be enough for the reader to gauge some of 
the specificities of the revolutionary events and the first steps of Soviet rule in the 
region compared to the situation in the rest of what, in 1922, became the USSR. 
These specificities should be kept in mind to understand the underpinnings of the 
“national” nature of Red Orient since its origin. 
 Peter Holquist defines the long period of WWI, revolution, and civil war as 
a “continuum of crisis.”27 He focuses on the grain-producing Don territory in the 
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south of European Russia; in the case of Russian Central Asia, it might be 
preferable to extend the “continuum” to the mid-1920s in order to include the 
“pacification” of the central provinces of Turkestan. The war increased the 
demand for raw cotton, which led to the unprecedented expansion of the acreage 
under this crop and of the total cotton output in 1915. In 1916, however, the 
situation started to degenerate rapidly: revolt in the countryside spread from the 
Djizakh district, between Samarkand and Tashkent, to Fergana and, above all, to 
Semirechie in what is now southern Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan.28 The 
revolt had both remote and immediate causes: the former included, above all, 
long-standing conflicts over the use of resources between the native population 
and Russian and European settlers; among the latter, increased fiscal pressure 
and the conscription of local Muslim men for military service in labor battalions. 
The 1916 uprising constitutes the first step in the concatenation of inter-ethnic 
violence and retaliation that accompanied the political and military turmoil of the 
1917 revolutionary year, and in the involvement of Central Asia in the civil war.29 
 Between 1918 and 1922, Central Asia went through its own internal civil 
war, which saw the opposition between the Red Army and a galaxy of armed 
opponents, characterized by very different degrees of ideological consistency, 
military organization, and transnational connections. From an economic 
viewpoint, the season of anti-Soviet insurgency (known in sources and literature 
as basmachestvo) brought about generalized collapse: confrontations resulted in 
the destruction of valuable capital (cotton cleaning mills, pumping stations, 
telegraph lines) while both the Red Army and the basmachi bands imposed a 
heavy toll on draught animals by expropriating horses and forage. Peasants 
stopped going out in the fields for fear of being attacked, and, combined with 
depopulation, this led to the neglect and disruption of the irrigation and drainage 
systems. As Soviet observers were ready to acknowledge, during the years of 
revolution and basmachestvo, large parts of Central Asia regressed to a natural 
economy and to subsistence agriculture. 30  This state of things in the local 
economy combined itself with demographic crisis. The only quantitative estimate 
of population losses in Central Asia in this period, published by Buttino in 1990, 
claims that “between 1916 and 1920 some two million people were lost, 
equivalent to 27 percent of the population.” This phenomenon concerned the 
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native Muslim population, in particular the nomads, more than the Russians.31 
Human capital also deteriorated in terms of the health, skills, and knowledge of 
the laboring population. For instance, in Qashqa-Darya, sericulture had been a 
side activity before 1917, as the survival of abundant plantations of mulberry trees 
still testified ten years later, but in 1927 Qashqa-Darya peasants were reportedly 
planting the silkworm grains they received from the cooperatives in the earth, as 
if they were seeds.32 
 This was, in short, the economic scenario the Bolsheviks were facing when 
they finally managed to gain control of the territory of Central Asia. Political 
issues were equally complicated. In a first phase, the Tashkent Soviet had 
adopted a chauvinist policy, especially in the management of food provisions. 
This was not, however, a viable approach; as Moscow realized by the summer of 
1919, it was necessary to forge an alliance with the progressive and pro-Bolshevik 
wings of the local Muslim intelligentsia. Reciprocally, the revolutionary 
atmosphere (which had been developing since 1905) had precipitated 
expectations of autonomy, political representation, and reform, both in 
Turkestan and in the two protectorates. The Bolsheviks gradually opened up their 
ranks to Turkestani Muslims and stretched out a hand to those who were known 
as the “Young Khivans” and “Young Bukharans” from the former protectorates. 
In September 1920, activists of these groups participated in the coups that, with 
the substantial help of the Red Army, led to the establishment of two people’s 
republics in Khorezm (KhNSR) and Bukhara (BNSR).33 Developments in the 
sphere of nationalities policy allowed the formation, within the Party, of specific 
organizations for the Muslims of the former empire, which would attract a 
number of new leaders into the Party’s orbit. These developments also lay at the 
origin of the “decolonizing” land-and-water reform in Semirechie and elsewhere 
in Turkestan (1921-1922).34 
 Adeeb Khalid argues that there is a connection between the ideas of the 
“Young Bukharans” and those that circulated in the late Ottoman empire35 and 
that the BNSR was “an attempt at creating a modern national state for the 
Muslim population of Bukhara.”36 While the discussion of the strength of such 
connections is best left to specialists in intellectual history, what matters here is 
that the BNSR's identity (and, above all, what it would become) was not set in 
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stone from the beginning. Above all, the economic relations between Moscow and 
Bukhara were quite fluid between 1920 and 1924. When, on the background of 
“decolonizing” rhetoric, Moscow decided to “devolve” a set of industrial plants to 
the BNSR, it thought (and possibly hoped) that this move would attract and settle 
the latter into its own orbit. But when Bukharan politicians pleaded to obtain and 
retain the management of the same plants, they may have had different 
expectations; they had to answer to domestic political stakeholders and were 
themselves trying to build a future for their country that was probably different 
from that envisaged by Moscow.  
 One can extend this approach to the years after 1924 when all of Central 
Asia was reshuffled as a consequence of “national delimitation.” This process led 
to the establishment of “national republics” and “autonomous provinces,” the 
frontiers of which roughly correspond to today’s international borders.37 On that 
occasion, the Uzbek SSR inherited the BNSR's assets, including its industrial 
trust and the plants it was managing. As we look at the vicissitudes of Red Orient, 
it is essential not to lose track of what was at stake: negotiations were not just 
about a couple of textile mills that the “center” would have ended up controlling 
anyway (how could one have known in 1922, or even in 1926?), but instead were 
about shaping long-lasting economic relations at what was perceived as a crucial 
historical moment. That the Central Asian side would be losing ground 
throughout the 1920s is clear to us, but it was not something the actors 
themselves could have forecast. Practically and symbolically, the ownership of a 
set of textile mills, however located, showed that it was possible, for the BNSR, 
and then for the Uzbek SSR, to participate in the industrial transformation of its 
main export: cotton.  
 
2.3 New Economic Policy and Soviet textile industry 
The term “New Economic Policy” (Novaia ekonomicheskaia politika, or NEP) 
designates a set of measures and, by extension, a phase in the early history of the 
Soviet Union. By comparison to the period of “War Communism” which had 
preceded it, one of the cornerstones of the NEP was the renunciation of forced 
requisitioning of agricultural products, which was replaced in March 1921 by a 
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progressive agricultural tax. The NEP sought to make amends for the “war” the 
Bolsheviks had waged against the peasantry in the previous years and to bring 
together workers in the agricultural and industrial sectors (smychka). In Central 
Asia, one of the consequences of NEP was to bring radical “decolonization” 
policies to an end. In practice, the NEP aimed at recovering pre-revolutionary 
output levels in many sectors (including agriculture) by allowing market relations 
between economic actors. In the meantime, the NEP aimed at the conciliation 
between the Bolshevik ideal of workers’ empowerment and the need to expand 
and rationalize industrial production – which, in turn, should have satisfied the 
peasant demand for consumer goods. In this context, textile factories represented 
an important testing ground because the textile sector had been particularly 
important for the industrialization of Russia before the revolution but had 
virtually collapsed during the civil war. It is not surprising, thus, to find a rich 
historiography of the textile sector before and during the New Economic Policy. 
Some of these studies have focused on the institutional framework of the early 
Soviet textile industry38 while, more recently, historians have looked more in 
depth at the organization of labor within the factory and at the political culture of 
the workers themselves.39 
 As in other countries, in Russia WWI brought about a push towards the 
centralization of key economic sectors. In the second half of 1915, to co-ordinate 
the procurements and industrial transformation of textile raw materials, the 
ministry of trade and industry established three committees, focusing on cotton, 
wool, and flax and jute respectively, and invited private entrepreneurs to 
participate in their work. These organs, however, did not manage to exert their 
grasp on the markets despite virtually fixed prices on textile consumers’ goods 
and on raw cotton in 1916. The situation evolved after the revolution of February 
1917: in response to an increasingly chaotic situation, a group of textile 
entrepreneurs in European Russia set up a new organization, Tsentrotkan’, to 
regulate the distribution of manufactured goods. It seems, however, that 95 
percent of the value of retail transactions involving textile goods fell beyond the 
grasp of Tsentrotkan’.40 
 This can be regarded in hindsight as an important step towards the 
centralization of textile production, but precisely because it was the fruit of an 
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industrialists’ initiative, Tsentrotkan’ could not go through the October 
revolution unscathed. The Bolsheviks established a new set of organs of economic 
governance and planning, including the Supreme council of the national economy 
(VSNKh, or Vesenkha). In December 1917, VSNKh labored to set up its own 
alternative Tsentrotkan’ for the Moscow region with the involvement of the 
factory workers themselves. Having settled the governance of the textile industry 
in this way, the Bolshevik government, at the beginning of January 1918, moved 
on to reform the mechanism for the provision of cotton. All cotton was declared 
State property, and the State enjoyed a monopoly on its trade at all levels, at least 
theoretically, the degree of control the new regime could exert in Turkestan being 
limited. Finally, between January and February 1918, the first congress of the 
Union of textile workers decided on the establishment of a new, more powerful 
organ called Tsentrotekstil’ which concentrated more powers than the previous 
Tsentrotkan’ by including the wool sector and spindling more firmly within its 
scope. Tsentrotekstil’ was formally subordinated to the VSNKh. This new 
institutional framework consolidated itself in April 1918.41 On June 28, 1918, a 
decree of the Russian council of people’s commissars (Sovnarkom) decided on 
the nationalization of all big textile enterprises under the leadership of 
Tsentrotekstil’. Yet its performance was rather disappointing. Hence, in October 
1918, the VSNKh established yet another organ, a “head administration” (glavnoe 
upravlenie, or glavka) for the textile industry, known for short as Glavtekstil’.42 
Between October and the end of January 1919, Glavtekstil’ and Tsentrotekstil’ 
worked together; then the former absorbed the latter. 43  From the first 
Tsentrotkan’, through Tsentrotekstil’, to Glavtekstil’, the Bolshevik regime was 
building upon the war experience to subordinate the textile added-value chain to 
a central organ and, through this, to the VSNKh. 44  This was the general 
institutional framework of the textile sector, yet, in the factories themselves, day-
to-day management was assured, with mixed results, by the workers’ unions or 
by the workers’ shock committees. In Chris Ward’s words, “Glavtekstil’ act[ed] 
less as a directing agency and more like a co-ordinating committee between the 
unions and Vesenkha”; at any rate, “[b]y 1920 there was precious little actual 
production for these bureaucrats to administer.”45 This was the situation in the 
factories which Red Orient took on in 1922. 
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 The creation of trusts (tresty) and syndicates (sindikaty) in the second half 
of 1921, with the advent of the New Economic Policy, should be read against this 
background. This move should have allowed a better management of production 
and, above all, economies of scale. While less strictly subordinated to Glavtekstil’, 
the trusts had, nevertheless, to be registered at VSNKh. All the assets these trusts 
possessed had been nationalized, but their own status could vary: some of them 
were private, but the majority were “mixed,” that is, co-owned by a State 
organization (generally the VSNKh) and semi-autonomous agencies, such as 
banks, or other trusts.46 In the textile sector, notes Ward, “trustification” was 
relatively quick: in December 1921, nine of the twenty-two trusts registered at 
VSNKh operated in this field. Each of them consisted of one or more textile 
plants. These could be either specializing in the same process (e.g., spindling), or 
they could bring together, for instance, a spinning mill with a weaving one and a 
workhouse for dyeing or mercerization. Three textile trusts had all-Union 
significance while the others were organized on a territorial basis. Trusts kept 
their own accounts, procured their raw materials, and sold their output on the 
open market. Such leeway, though, found a limit in the intervention of Party cells 
and Party representatives in the management. Moreover, the possibility for each 
trust to establish its own prices was curtailed in the summer of 1923 when “trust 
functions were limited to technical supervision while Vesenkha […] fixed prices 
and handed down production targets.”47 These moves also affected the life of Red 
Orient.  
 Parallel to the organization of a number of trusts, the NEP period also saw 
the creation of an all-Union Textile Syndicate: Vsesoiuznyi Tekstil’nyi Sindikat, 
or VTS. Unlike Glavtekstil’, which continued to exist together with other similar 
directorates,48 the VTS's role was not so much to co-ordinate production as to 
balance the distribution of output and make sure that the peasantry would 
receive a sufficient and timely amount of manufacture in order to maintain the 
“alliance” (smychka) between the factory and the country which lay at the very 
foundation of NEP itself. “[A] joint-stock company operating under state 
auspices,”49 the VTS aimed at the full “syndicalization” of the wholesale and retail 
distribution of textiles. This goal was not easy to attain, particularly in Central 
Asia. In this region, the VTS had to face two specific issues. First, the percentage 
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of its wholesale sales that went to private merchants was more substantial – and 
it only diminished slowly, if at all, during the NEP – than in any other region of 
the USSR.50 Second, besides the competition of private merchants, in Central 
Asia (and in the Uzbek SSR in particular) the VTS had to deal, willy-nilly, with 
one single, powerful partner, the Cotton Committee, which exerted formidable 
economic leverage in order to control the provision of manufactures to the 
countryside.51 
 To understand Red Orient’s position, it is also necessary to consider how 
these trusts procured their raw materials, namely ginned cotton. The key 
institution here was the Central Cotton Committee (Glavnyi Khlopkovyi Komitet, 
or Glavkhlopkom in acronym). Although it was technically a joint stock company, 
the Glavkhlopkom acted as an organ of the all-Union VSNKh. If one looks at its 
functions rather than at its denomination, its origins can be found in the war 
years, particularly in the advent of fixed prices for Turkestani raw cotton and in 
the virtual constitution of a “cartel” of cotton merchants. Politically, the idea of a 
specialized cotton committee took shape in late 1919 when the special 
commission of the all-Union central committee of the party on Turkestan 
(Turkkomissiia) was charged, together with the VSNKh, with the compilation of 
its statute.52 
A complex and ever-changing web of relations based on shareholding and 
credit tied the Central Cotton Committee to all-Union and regional banks, State 
organs, trusts, and so on. In particular, besides the all-Union Central Cotton 
Committee, there were local cotton “committees.” At the beginning, they were 
joint stock companies, basically co-owned by the republics of Turkestan, 
Bukhara, and Khorezm (not to mention Transcaucasia). Then they evolved into 
republican agencies which the Glavkhlopkom strove to control, with varying 
results. The power of the Committees extended to the regulation of the 
production, quality control, pricing, and sales of raw cotton. This was, in broad 
terms, the institutional framework of the cotton sector in which Red Orient had 
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3. From the Russo-Bukharan Manufacture to Red Orient 
 
The origin of Red Orient cannot be fully apprehended without looking at it 
through the prism of Bolshevik nationalities policy in the early 1920s. As Jeremy 
Smith persuasively demonstrates in his important 1999 book, The Bolsheviks and 
the National Question, the new regime’s attitude was shaped by the practicalities 
of the revolution and the subsequent civil war. In particular, these policies 
oscillated between the Austro-Marxist definition of self-determination (Ger. 
Selbstbestimmung, Rus. samoopredelenie),53 aiming at cultural autonomy for 
population groups which could not be easily defined in space, and that which was 
emerging from the ashes of WWI, which insisted on the allocation of a specific, 
bounded territory to each national group. 54  According to Smith, from the 
revolution to 1920, “national self-determination was implemented outside of 
Russia,” and “alliances were built with nationalist movements” while rights were 
granted to linguistic minorities within Russia. After 1920, national autonomous 
territories were created inside Russia. 55  According to Terry Martin, “an 
authoritative formulation” of Bolshevik nationalities policy emerged at the XII 
all-Russian party congress in 1923.56 
 Neither of these works, however, explores the entanglement between 
political history and the history of economic policy, and the agency of the 
“national communists” is particularly neglected in the latter. For instance, Smith 
dedicates a paragraph to the “massive programme of industrial development [of] 
non-Russian areas” and even mentions Red Orient57 but neglects to discuss the 
achievements of such a move or explain it as anything more than the Bolshevik 
“rhetoric of backwardness” in dealing with the former imperial peripheries. The 
story of Red Orient must be seen instead as a reflection of local national 
communists' ability to exploit the category of “backwardness” to extract benefits 
from the “center” rather than the implementation of the latter’s top-down diktats. 
This is true not only in the way the trust was created and received its first textile 
mills, but also in the way it tried to orient its relations with other economic 
actors, such as the powerful Egor’evskii trust, which had supplied one-half of the 
initial capital. In the very difficult context of the early NEP period, characterized 
by lack of credit, unavailable raw materials and energy, and monetary instability, 
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Red Orient (and the BNSR behind it) could rely on two resources: the production 
of raw cotton and, more importantly, its “national” nature. From 1924, the 
importance of this second aspect increased dramatically as the Egor’evskii pulled 
out of Red Orient’s shareholding (though maintaining considerable commercial 
credit). 
3.1 The industrial side of nationality policy in Central Asia 
Against this political-ideological background, the decision-making process that 
led to the emergence of the trust which would become Red Orient remains 
difficult to reconstruct. Even primary evidence was often compiled after the 
allocation of assets to the BNSR had taken place and may be inexact. There seems 
to be agreement, though, that the trust evolved as a consequence of decisions 
made at the XI all-Russian Party congress (March 27 to April 2, 1922). One of its 
resolutions was to carry out the “planned establishment of industry in the 
peripheries [na okrainakh], by means of the transfer [perenos] of factories to the 
sources of raw materials.” This concerned, first of all, textile factories, but it 
seems that the Party central committee looked on the establishment of such 
textile factories in the former Turkestan ASSR, Turkmenia, and Transcaucasia as 
an exceptional measure.58 The desirability (but not yet the assurance) that a 
cotton textile factory would be built specifically in Turkestan was first formulated 
in a deliberation of the Labor and Defence Council (Sovet Truda i Oborony, STO 
in acronym) on October 6, 1922 and confirmed by the VSNKh on November 18, 
1922. 59  It was at this point that the provincial revolutionary committee of 
Fergana asked that the factory be built in Fergana (New Margelan), claiming that 
such a location benefitted from water resources and a favorable climate.60 An 
additional argument, which might have resonated in the ears of many Soviet 
decision-makers at the time, was that cottage industry and crafts already existed 
and flourished in the neighboring city of Margelan while the coal mines of Kyzyl-
Kia were equally close; this would create optimal conditions for the emergence of 
a cluster of factory workers.61 Even though New Margelan did not receive its 
factory at the time, it is worth bearing these arguments in mind to understand 
what would happen later in the same locality.  
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 There were two distinct transfers of industrial assets (instrumental 
machinery, but sometimes entire factories) to the BNSR and Turkestan: one of 
them concerned assets that could materially be packed and transported to 
Central Asia; the other included objects located on the territory of the RSFSR. 
Hence, in the framework of the initiatives that followed the XI all-Union Party 
congress in late March-early April 1922, on July 14, 1922 a decision of the all-
Union Politbiuro bound Soviet Russia (the RSFSR) to transfer all the nationalized 
assets necessary to establish four industrial plants -- a textile plant, a tanning 
yard, a paper factory, and a soap plant -- to the BNSR by 1923.62 It is in this 
second initiative, which was also a product of the XI congress, that one sees the 
origin of Red Orient. No physical transfer of textile mills to the Central Asian 
“periphery” happened before 1926; instead, the BNSR ended up with multiple 
textile factories not in Bukhara, but in Russia.  
A closer look at military events and at Fayzulla Khojaev’s key political role 
at the time suggests the reason why the Moscow Party and Soviet organs felt the 
need to transfer these industrial assets to this Central Asian allied republic or, at 
least, allows a glimpse into the specific incentives they might have been 
responding to in the spring of 1922. At the beginning of that year, Khojaev was 
not in Bukhara but in Moscow where he was negotiating the status of the 
Bukharan People’s Republic and its communist party. However, he had to return 
quickly to Bukhara in March to cope with the new military and political crisis 
caused by Enver Pasha’s volte-face and the consequent revival of the anti-
Bolshevik insurgency in the region. As a member of the revolutionary military 
council in charge of anti-basmachi struggle in eastern Bukhara, Khojaev was in a 
relatively good position to ask for and obtain Moscow’s support. It is legitimate to 
surmise that such support not only concerned the “exceptional measures” which 
Fayzulla Khojaev had to take to face the guerrillas63 but also included more 
material benefits, such as the promise to transfer to the BNSR the industrial 
installations in question. 
Among the industrial plants promised to Bukhara in Spring 1922, the 
tanning yard and the soap factory were just a technologically more advanced 
form of economic activities that already existed in the emirate (and in Central 
Asia in general). The paper factory was a novelty, and even more so the textile 
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mill; no spinning factory in the modern sense had existed in Central Asia before 
the revolution, still less a weaving factory. We know that the paper factory had 
already reached Bukhara by January 1923, while the BNSR decided not to accept 
the soap plant. Nor did it go to the trouble of packing and shipping the promised 
tanning yard because the machinery had already irretrievably deteriorated.64 The 
capital stock must have been in poor condition indeed for Fayzulla Khojaev to 
give it up at once, as industry surely did not abound in Bukhara at the time. 
Khojaev tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a bargain with Moscow to swap the 
tanning yard and the soap factory for a wool textile plant. His argument – that 
Bukharan raw wool could be more cheaply spun on the spot – did not persuade, 
or, possibly, by early 1923 his position with Moscow had weakened because of the 
temporary victory over the basmachi.65 In the end, a report compiled by the 
Uzbek government on the state of local industry noted that, in 1926, the only 
industrial enterprises in Bukhara province were a printing-press, a tanning yard, 
and a brick factory – and the tanning yard was not the one promised in 1922.66 
The story of the textile mill, which interests us the most, is more 
complicated. With all its shortcomings, the spindling and weaving machinery in 
question was too precious to be discarded for both material and symbolic 
reasons: the textile sector was perceived as the basis and quintessence of 
industrial manufacturing, it maintained a special relation to Central Asian cotton 
production, and Bukhara, with Turkestan, had been experiencing a real “hunger” 
for cotton textiles since 1917. The Bukharan government was ready to get hold of 
the factory without having to move it. The Supreme Council for the National 
Economy (VSNKh) had said that the factory could remain where it was (in the 
Riazan’ guberniia) if the Bukharan government wished. The Bukharan and, later, 
Uzbek governments did not oppose this decision.67 The factory was officially 
assigned to the BNSR by a decision the Presidium of the all-Union VSNKh as 
early as December 9, 1922, and in January 1923, Khojaev could boast that it was 
already employing 1,800 workers.68 
The textile mill, called Zaraiskaia because of its location (now it would be 
in the Moscow region), constituted the backbone of the Red Orient trust, and 
information about it is quite extensive. Because this was the first plant to be 
assigned to the BNSR and because it was devoted to both spinning and weaving, 
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the entire trust sometimes identified with the Zaraiskaia factory in these first 
years. Before nationalization, it had originally been part of the Swiss Anonymous 
Society.69 The factory had then belonged to a mammoth of textile production in 
the early NEP period, the Egor’evskii trust, but it constituted such a small 
proportion of the trust’s activity that, for instance, no reference to it or its 
transfer can be found in a detailed 1923 report compiled by the trest itself for the 
Moscow Workers and Peasants Inspection (MRKI). 70  Because the Bukhara 
people’s republic did not have the resources to restore the Zaraiskaia factory, 
though, the Egor’evskii trust was called upon, with the blessing of the VSNKh, to 
constitute the “Bukharan-Russian Commercial Cotton Textile Manufacture” 
(Bukharsko-Russkaia Tovarnaia Khlopchato-Bumazhnaia Manufaktura), 
which would soon become Red Orient. The Bukharan government and the 
Egor’evskii trust contributed each half of the total capital stock (600 thousand 
rubles),71 but the management of the plant was in the hands of the former. More 
exactly, this company answered to its industry and trade ministry (nazirat).  
It is impossible, in the present state of research, to know whether the 
treatment of the Bukharan People’s Republic was exceptional or fit a pattern that 
Moscow applied to other “national republics” in the same years. There is, 
however, some evidence that other Central Asian republics were offered textile 
mills in Russia. In one of the few works devoted to this topic, two Uzbekistani 
historians write that, as a consequence of the STO decision of October 6, 1922 
mentioned above, the VSNKh decided to transfer to the Turkestan republic a 
factory of the former Izmailovskaia manufaktura, with 42,000 reels and 620 
looms while the VSNKh “textile section” had to provide the necessary additional 
machinery to let it recommence its production.72 In addition, the Uzbekistani 
historians state that the Turkestan republic, following a suggestion by the 
powerful Ivanovo-Vosnesenskii trust, was able to rent another factory, previously 
owned by the Bolshaia Shuiskaia manufaktura, at an advantageous rate.73 It is 
open to speculation, though, whether the Turkestan republic did indeed take on 
the management of one or both these textile plants; there is no sign of the fate of 
these factories during the “liquidation” of the Turkestan republic’s assets during 
the process of national delimitation.74 
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The case of Turkmenia and of its Turkmenmanufaktura is much clearer 
and, though similar to Red Orient’s in its general lines, follows a different timing. 
Turkmenia had to wait until it became a fully-fledged republic before it could 
acquire a textile factory on Russian territory: the Reutovskaia factory, located in 
Reutovo, in the Moscow hinterland. The memory and traces of this Turkmen 
connection in Reutovo still seem to be alive.75 The Reutovskaia, which included 
both spindling and weaving, became available to the Turkmen SSR in the 1924-
1925 economic year, later than Bukhara had acquired the Zaraiskaia. Like the 
latter, the Reutovskaia factory served as a training ground for the first cadres of 
Turkmen specialized workers. 76  This role was implicitly celebrated in Dziga 
Vertov's 1926 film, Sixth-Part of the World.77 In 1925, the Turkmen republic also 
started developing successful plans to establish a first cotton textile plant on its 
own territory, parallel to the construction of the Fergana factory. 
 
3.2 Red Orient’s Russian factories 
The importance of the Zaraiskaia factory was not only that this was the first 
plant around which the Bukharan trust took shape. More than the other factories 
Red Orient acquired or rented in the following years, the Zaraiskaia had an 
important political function: it was conceived as a “school” for the preparation of 
the first generation of native Central Asian (Bukharan, then Uzbek) skilled 
industrial workers. The Uzbek republican VSNKh started maneuvering in this 
sense in October 1925; the first one hundred young people were sent for training 
to the Riazan’ province in 1926. The relevance of this training initiative for the 
intended future of the Uzbek SSR was highlighted by the visits Faizulla Khojaev 
and Yuldash Akhunbabaev paid to this contingent of young people on their trips 
to Moscow. According to a commemorative publication some four decades later, 
the group of trainees consisted of both young men and women (one fifth of the 
total), aged between 16 and 19. A condition of enrollment was the ability to read, 
write, and express oneself in Russian. The composition of this group in terms of 
geographic provenance reflected the special connection between the Zaraiskaia 
factory and Bukhara. The trainees came largely from provinces that had been part 
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of the latter before the national delimitation, namely Zeravshan, Qashqa-Daria, 
and Surkhan-Daria – although some others were from Penjikent and Ura-Tepe.78 
Another important textile mill, called Krasnyi Uzbekistan, was located in 
the Moscow region in what is nowadays the territory of the city of Chekhov.79 It 
was also known by its pre-revolutionary name, Veniukovskaia fabrika, and 
included both spinning and weaving facilities. The plant used to belong to the 
Medvedev family of manufacturers. As other assets received by the Bukharan 
trust, this factory had been a victim of the general collapse of the textile sector in 
the civil war years. This is reflected in the records which the Moscow Council for 
the national economy (MSNKh) kept for 1921: production had plummeted and, 
although the number of workers did not diminish much, the number of working 
days was indeed very small. For instance, in July 1921, the days of inactivity were 
26 – in practice, all the weekdays in the month. The summer of 1921 seemed to 
bring some relief, but the MSNKh noted at the beginning of 1922 that everything 
depended on the provisioning of raw materials, which was extremely 
discontinuous.80 The Veniukovskaia fabrika, thus, was well on its way to being 
mothballed, cannibalized, or absorbed by other organizations, as happened to 
other textile plants.81 Red Orient started counting the Veniukovskaia among its 
assets after October 1924 when it began renting it from the Serpukhovskii trust 
on the basis of a ten-year contract.82 In 1925, its exact denomination showed that 
the Veniukovskaia fabrika specialized in weaving and printing cotton cloth, both 
chintz (sitets) and other kinds of fabric.83 At the same time, Red Orient obtained 
the machinery and assets of a dyeing and printing factory close to the village of 
Fili (now incorporated in western Moscow), originally owned by a A.Yu. Efros. 
This factory, too, was about to be dismantled.84  
Besides these assets, the now Uzbek trust tried renting a couple more 
textile plants, for reasons and with consequences which we will discuss below. 
Between 1924 and 1925, Red Orient rented a fourth factory in eastern Moscow 
(Kirpichnaia street), the Blagushinskaia fabrika. This had allegedly formerly 
belonged to a Rabinovich although another document mentions that it was part 
of the Petrovskaia Manufaktura. In the mid-1920s, this factory was “owned” and 
managed by the MSNKh through the Moscow Textile Company (Moskovskoe AO 
Tekstil’nogo Proizvodstva). It consisted of both a weaving and a dyeing, twisting, 
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and finishing (mercerizing) department, but Red Orient was only interested in 
renting the second. 85  Although in mid-1924 this factory was regarded as 
“strategic” because of its twisting department, the available accounting materials 
were inadequate, which in turn made the assessment of its real potential 
problematic and might explain why Red Orient abandoned it fairly soon.86 In 
April 1926, another organization took on the Blagushinskaia although it is 
unclear on whose behalf. We can be sure that in 1928 the factory began to be 
rented by the Vigon’trest, whose activity focused – as the name suggests – on 
wool rather than on cotton.87 Similarly, at the end of 1924, Krasnyi Vostok rented 
a fifth factory from two private citizens, Costa and Kaulen (Zubovskaia fabrika, a 
weaving plant), in the Klin district, north of Moscow. It would dismiss it only one 
year later, though, in the framework of the same general reshaping of the trest’s 
assets and activities which engulfed the Blagushinskaia factory.88  
Some activities which had little or nothing to do with spinning or weaving 
also depended on the Zaraiskaia fabrika: a brick factory, a steam mill, a peat 
quarry, and, it seems, a couple of State farms (sovkhozy).89 Much more relevant 
than these, however, were the many shares that Red Orient had in important 
local banks, such as Mosgorbank and Nizhgorbank, based in Moscow and 
Nizhnii Novgorod respectively, and in two federal banks, Prombank and 
Vneshtorgbank. The first of these two, or “Industrial Bank,” depended directly on 
Piatakov’s VSNKh and constituted, in a way, the latter’s “financial arm”; in 1926, 
Red Orient was severely indebted with it. The second depended on the people’s 
commissariat of international trade. Finally, we know that the trest “owned” 
some circulating capital (raw materials and ready products) and real estate in the 
Bukharan people’s republic, and later in the Uzbek SSR. At the beginning of 1925, 
these non-industrial real estate “properties” included seven concessionary 
“departments” (otdelenia), thirteen brand shops, and ten stalls (lavki).90 All this 
seems to reflect the diversified interests of the trust – a diversification that some 
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3.3 Business-to-business relations: first ambiguities 
In short, in the first years of activity, Red Orient consisted of two main textile 
plants, one (Zaraiskaia) devoted to spinning and weaving, and the other 
(Veniukovskaia) to weaving and printing. The latter was rented while the former 
used to belong to the original partner of the Bukharan people’s republic, the 
Egor’evskii trest, one of the largest cotton textile producers in NEP Russia. A 
controversy arose almost immediately between the Bukharan People’s Republic 
and its partner, which exemplifies both the complicated intersection between 
issues that were characteristic of all business and industrial enterprises in the 
early NEP period and the specificities of Red Orient as a “national” trust. It is 
therefore worth narrating this controversy in some detail. 
 Because of the widespread de-monetization of the economy after the 
revolution and civil war, the partnership of the Egor’evskii trust and Red Orient 
for the exploitation of the Zaraiskaia factory was based on the conferring of 
consumables. Yet while the BNSR immediately paid its share in raw cotton, the 
Egor’evskii trust apparently never conferred what it had promised (fuel, raw 
materials, and money). In addition, in January 1923, the Egor’evskii trust bought 
yarn at credit from the Zaraiskaia for an amount more or less equivalent to its 
participation in the equity of the Bukharskaia manufaktura. In practice, the 
Egor’evskii trust was assuming that it could borrow at leisure from the weaker 
Central Asian partner. In March, the management of Red Orient (which had by 
then supplanted the Bukharskaia Manufaktura) decided to retaliate by 
suspending its supply of yarn to the Egor’evskii trust. This dissolved the 
partnership between the two organizations despite the fact that the latter had an 
important participation in the former. By then, the Egor’evskii trust had paid less 
than two-thirds of its share of the stock capital; this resulted in a massive credit 
for Red Orient, to which one should add all the arrears for the unpaid yarn. A 
deliberation of the Presidium of the MSNKh (the Council for the National 
Economy of the Moscow region) allowed the Egor’evskii trust to pull out of Red 
Orient in mid-April 1923 while the Bukharan government agreed to “buy back” 
the latter’s share by selling its yarn to the Egor’evskii trust at a 10 percent 
discount, starting in July 1923. All this meant that the Bukharan/Uzbek trust was 
intrinsically under-capitalized, not only because of the general scarcity of ready 
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money or bank credit, but also because of the asymmetry between the two 
partners: the big and Moscow-backed Egor’evskii trust clearly saw the 
Zaraiskaia factory as its own and still intended to integrate it in its own 
production chain. The obstinacy of the Egor’evskii trust in trying to receive yarn 
virtually for free (or at long-term credit) suggests that it was trying to compress 
its own costs at the expense of Red Orient, clearly caring little about the latter’s 
viability. The decision of the MSNKh in this respect favored the stronger side. On 
the other stood the BNSR (and then the Uzbek SSR) which possessed very little 
economic leverage besides its own cotton production. 
 The controversy, however, did not end when the Egor’evskii trust 
relinquished its shares in Red Orient. One year later, in June 1924, the Bukharan 
trust announced that it had fulfilled its obligations towards its former partner 
and even claimed a credit of some fifty thousand rubles. The Egor’evskii trust 
replied that it was Red Orient’s turn to be in debt by some seventeen thousand 
rubles. The two parts submitted this issue to the attention of the arbitration 
commission of the Labor and Defence Council (STO).92 From Red Orient’s point 
of view, this was not a very wise move. The result of the ensuing inquiry was that 
its books fell under the magnifying glass of the people’s commissariat for the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection (NKRKI, or Rabkrin).  
 
4. Red Orient under Bukharan rule 
Between 1924 and 1925, Red Orient was the object of two distinct inspections of 
the Rabkrin, which scrutinized the managers and their practices. The two 
inspections, however, had very different origins and motives. The Rabkrin was 
not acting on its own initiative but responding to calls for action from various 
actors concerned in the activity and destiny of Red Orient. The peculiar situation 
of this trust, its “national” nature, combined with the physical location of its 
factories in Russia – complicated the question of its management. The first 
Rabkrin inspection reflected the interests of the Bukharan government and its 
wish to link more tightly Red Orient with its own trade organization, 
Bukhgostorg. The second inspection, in all likelihood precipitated by the 
controversy with the Egor’evskii trest, was prompted by Red Orient’s Russian 
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competitors. In this case, too, the “national” nature of Red Orient was relevant, as 
it could be wielded to deflect accusations of inefficiency and mismanagement. 
Both these episodes flesh out the relation that existed between the republican 
government and its “national” trust beyond what was reflected in shareholding 
schemes and formal resolutions. 
 
4.1 Micro-management and “Oriental”’ intrigues  
It is not easy to reconstruct the identity of the managers of the factories the trust 
controlled, and of Red Orient as a whole. As a general rule, at least until 1926, 
political credentials appeared more important than technical or managerial 
qualifications. In this, Red Orient was not different from many other Soviet 
enterprises, in particular in light industry, where shortcomings in the selection of 
leading staff can be explained by the Bolshevik scepticism towards managers in 
general.93 The first chair of the governing body of Red Orient seems to have been 
one Aleksei Aleksandrovich Beliakov, at least in 1923 and for some part of 1924.94 
According to a different source, in 1924, the head manager of Red Orient was 
Ata-Khojaev (Pulatovich). Already a member of the central committee of the 
“Young Bukharans” since the late spring of 1917, 95  he had been in charge 
(ostensibly as deputy) of the internal affairs of the people’s republic until the 
summer of 1923 and then became its representative in Moscow. Ata-Khojaev had 
lost his post in the government of the BNSR as a consequence of the “purge” of 
the summer of 1923, which involved four ministers (or nazirs), including 
Abdalrauf Fitrat and Sattar Khojaev. They had been removed from government 
positions under different pretexts (e.g., “the surge of capitalist elements”), but 
essentially because of their “nationalist” inclinations, which Moscow, ostensibly, 
no longer tolerated. By moving to Moscow, Ata-Khojaev was not promoted; 
instead, he was physically removed from all direct opportunity to meddle with 
Bukharan affairs. In 1925, he was degraded to the role of assistant director of Red 
Orient though he managed, at the same time, to climb some steps of the ladder 
within the all-Union government.96 Yet the source that relates this move is partly 
in contradiction with the signatures at the bottom of the balance sheet deposited 
in October 1925, where one F. Klimov was the chair of the direction, while 
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Rappoport, Sattar Khojaev, and a L. Gerzman were the other members of the 
board. 97  It may be that, in his quality as a representative of the Bukharan 
government in Moscow, Ata-Khojaev was responsible for the smooth functioning 
of the trust, without actually being the chairman of its board. Whatever the 
decision on this specific question, it seems fair to state that Red Orient remained 
quite strongly under the influence of the leadership of the Bukharan people’s 
republic until at least 1926. It is interesting, in this respect, that documents dated 
1925 still refer to it as a “Bukharan” (not an “Uzbek”) trust. It was this Bukharan 
leadership, which included representatives of the local merchant class, that 
handled Beliakov and, through him, the Russian factories of Red Orient. While 
many of the managers and cadres on the spot remained Russian, European, or 
Jewish, they answered to the Bukharan government (and then, to Bukharan 
elements in the Uzbek government) directly or through the representative in 
Moscow. In this, the republican leadership was ready to employ tools for political 
and economic control that had emerged at the all-Union level, namely the 
vigilance of the People’s Commissariat for Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection 
(Rabkrin), in order to influence the fate of the trust and, if necessary, to discredit 
the managers. 
 At the beginning of 1924, Red Orient received a first visit by a commission 
of Rabkrin experts. This was anything but the result of an initiative by the 
“central” government in Moscow to strengthen its control of assets belonging to a 
“peripheral” republic; instead, the Bukharan nazir of industry and trade, 
Atabaev, had requested such auditing (revizia) of the trust’s books. It was the 
government of a “friendly” republic eliciting help from the central government of 
the Union to exert some control over the way its own “patrimony” in European 
Russia was managed. After all, this was a way to reduce control costs for Bukhara. 
Yet the Bukharan government (the council of nazirs) was not abstractly worried 
about Red Orient’s bookkeeping. They were more concerned about something 
closer to their hearts: the relations between the trust and their own State trade 
organization, Bukhgostorg. In its business with the latter, Red Orient acted both 
as a producer selling its output and an intermediary dealer – a role that the 
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 The nazirs’ grievances, on the basis of which the Rabkrin commission was 
intervening, went well beyond accounting but invested the business relations 
between Red Orient and Bukhgostorg more generally. First, it appeared that the 
prices of Red Orient’s products and those the latter imposed for commodities it 
had purchased elsewhere were too high, surely higher than those of the all-Union 
Textile Syndicate (VTS). Hence, Bukhgostorg did not manage to sell the goods it 
received from the trust at prices high enough to cover its own costs, which 
contributed to the growth of its deficit. Second, Red Orient was taking little 
account of the preferences of the Bukharan market, which made the task of the 
State trade organization even more difficult.98 The question was whether prices 
were too high because of high costs of production or because the trust was 
milking lucrative margins in its trade with Bukhgostorg. Even when they were 
commenting on Red Orient’s production, though, the attention of Rabkrin 
inspectors remained focused on business-to-business relations and on pricing 
policies between the Bukharan trust and its partners. In its first auditing of the 
trust, the Peasants’ and Workers’ Inspection essentially bypassed issues related to 
labor and technology.  
 The inspectors started by exposing a matter of fact: for various reasons, 
including the original under-capitalization, the assets of the Zaraiskaia fabrika 
were not used to their full capacity. This happened because the factory had 
remained closed for many years, some of the machinery probably needed repair, 
and spare parts were hard to obtain. But it was also the result of bad managerial 
choices. For instance, it seems that the management had used the lack of 
adequate supplies of yarn to justify the frequent interruptions which affected the 
weaving department, but this was hard to defend if, as it was the case, the 
Zaraiskaia fabrika was spinning its own yarn. The Rabkrin audit suggested the 
integration of these two functions and the use of the available capital to its full 
capacity to keep the impact of some costs (especially fuel) at bay. 
 To some extent, though, the lack of integration between spinning and 
weaving was not the managers' fault but arose from a structural deficiency of the 
factory itself: the latter did not, indeed, produce ready-to-weave yarn, but a semi-
finished yarn, which needed to be processed by sub-contractors (kontragenty). 
This happened because some of the factory’s textiles were not sold to the final 
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consumers but instead to other businesses in charge of finishing, dyeing, and 
printing them. These partners would not have accepted supplies of inferior 
quality (for instance, cloth made out of badly twisted or non-mercerized yarn).99 
Red Orient found this situation difficult because sub-contractors were slow in 
their payments, which in turn affected, as we will see, the trust’s own 
procurements. The Rabkrin commission suggested that, ultimately, the 
additional costs of this system would have been less than the revenue forgone if 
Red Orient had resigned itself to the production of inferior varieties of cotton 
fabric and sold it directly in the bazaars. 
 If “downwards” relations along the added-value chain were problematic 
enough, this was even truer for relations with other businesses “upwards,” 
namely the suppliers of ginned cotton to the spindling department of the 
Zaraiskaia fabrika. This was ostensibly a consequence of the management’s 
inability to time their purchases of raw materials to profit from the lower prices 
at the beginning of the season (soon after the harvest). The high cost of raw 
materials, then, was one of the reasons for the high cost (and price) of products. 
Being the victim of a constant lack of liquidity, the Bukharan trust did not have 
room to maneuver in timing its procurements and ended up buying either from 
“speculators” (on the private market) or at credit from the Bukhgostorg. Hence, 
the latter was not only paying the price of these higher costs by being unable to 
sell at convenient prices on the Central Asian market; it was also pouring money 
into Red Orient. As the auditors put it, in the receipts of transactions between 
Bukhgostorg and Red Orient “one hear[d] the voice of him that crieth in the 
wilderness about the failed payments of the factory for the cotton delivered [by 
Bukhgostorg]” [sic].100 
 In the end, the Rabkrin commission’s report emphasized the top 
management's responsibility for this state of things. A.A. Beliakov, who was 
responsible for Red Orient in this phase, felt that the relations between the trust 
and the Bukharan government had frozen. He believed that the latter was 
targeting him personally and tried to persuade the Rabkrin inspectors of this. Yet, 
how dismissively one of these inspectors, Udal’, considered Beliakov’s victimizing 
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Talking to me, A.A. [Beliakov] expressed the opinion that in Bukhara 
there is a plot against him [protiv nego v Bukhare intriga]. In 
conscience, I don’t think so. That the climate is clearly not in Red 
Orient’s favor, this is true. But one should not forget that it is Red Orient 
that provides three quarters of the motives for this […]. I absolutely do 
not think that a plot was spun especially against Beliakov. 
 
Udal’, who had travelled to Bukhara, knew perfectly well what the real reason for 
the nazirs’ coldness was: “One must look for the reasons of this aversion in the 
relations between Red Orient and Bukhgostorg. The latter has categorically 
decided to have nothing more to do with Red Orient, until the liquidation of all 
debts.”101 Apparently, Beliakov was doing little to pull the Bukharan trust out of 
this awkward situation; his management style was very ineffective, at least 
according to the commission. This is hardly surprising if, as it seems, his main 
qualification was that he had signed up to the Bolshevik party early in his life. 
 
He [scil. Beliakov] feels as if he were in Christ’s bosom – for everything, 
it is Beliakov who answers. Beliakov, the tradesman; Beliakov, the 
production manager. Beliakov [runs] at the meeting and at the assembly; 
Beliakov [goes] down to the shopfloor, and everywhere’s Beliakov! In the 
end, comrade Beliakov does not notice those mistakes and shortcomings 
that can be seen everywhere and on all sides, because one can never 
check [at the same time] on oneself and on others.102 
 
The inspectors concluded that all sorts of shortcomings marred the activity of 
Red Orient; these shortcomings pertained to the production itself, to the trust’s 
relations with its suppliers, and to the management in general. Interestingly, the 
commission seems, from the beginning, to have excluded the hypothesis that this 
situation also depended on inefficiencies on the side of Bukhgostorg itself. In this, 
Rabkrin was probably listening to the suggestions of the Bukharan nazirs who 
were keen on protecting their republican trade organization rather than their 
textile trust and were probably aiming at strengthening their control over the 
trust.  
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 This inquiry marked the beginning of Beliakov’s downfall. In his defense, 
Beliakov could state that, despite the negative conjuncture of 1923 for the textile 
sector in general, Red Orient had performed relatively well and even managed to 
make some profit. If this were true, Beliakov would have been a sacrificial victim 
immolated to satisfy Bukhara and the Bukhgostorg. All that the Rabkrin 
commission had discovered was plausible and quite possibly true. But how was it 
possible that Red Orient was making profits, when its production costs were so 
high that its output cost more than the VTS’s textiles? The truth is that such 
profits were not assured: much depended on how (and, above all, by whom) the 
balance sheets were compiled. Moreover, even if they existed, they probably 
depended more on Red Orient’s activity as a trading company than on its 
industrial production. Such trading activity, however, came under the magnifying 
glass of another Rabkrin inspection. Because of it, Red Orient had to defend itself 
with the help of the Uzbek government in a way that reveals the importance of its 
“national” nature. 
4.2 Red Orient between trade and industry 
If it was the Bukharan government that prompted the first inspection, economic 
governance organs residing in Moscow influenced the other, almost at the same 
time and pertaining to the same period. Although in principle this second one 
was a “routine” inspection, it surely took into account the interests of other textile 
trusts of the Moscow region and European Russia. In other words, if Red Orient’s 
stakeholders backed the first inquiry, the second voiced the various wishes and 
complaints of its competitors. What both groups shared was the resentment 
against some practices that were allegedly incompatible with the “values” of the 
socialist economy: the fact that accusations against Red Orient could be very 
different, and even completely opposed, though, illustrates the pliability of those 
“values” and the way economic actors could yield them against each other in any 
of the many institutional forums the Soviet system provided, including the 
Rabkrin. The second inspection, however, dug more deeply than the first in its 
effort to reveal structural inefficiencies in Red Orient’s production. These 
shortcomings differed from those visible in textile factories during NEP more in 
their scale than in their nature.  
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 The inspection started by looking at Red Orient’s trade activity. Already in 
May 1924, the control office of the Moscow stock exchange (birzha) had written 
to the Rabkrin to denounce the fact that Red Orient had been trafficking in goods 
other than the cotton cloth, or cotton yarn, it was supposed to produce. In 
addition – they wrote – it was partly thanks to these businesses “on the side” that 
the trust was sometimes selling its products at prices lower than those decided on 
the stock exchange itself (kotirovannye tseny). This had led to what the 
disgruntled accusers considered disloyal competition – or, more exactly, 
dumping. 103  In practice, as the Moscow stock exchange itself admitted, Red 
Orient’s management was doing nothing but behaving as it would have done 
before the Bolshevik revolution: besides what was necessary for its own 
production (raw materials, energy, etc.), the trust also bought and sold rice, 
kerosene, mineral oil, and even raw cotton, sometimes using it for swap 
operations against its own cloth production. In this way – by means of combining 
the production of cotton cloth with the traditional operations of a merchant 
house – Red Orient had been managing to reduce the amount of idle liquidity.104 
This may have displeased some of the other trusts and trade organizations who 
participated in the Moscow stock exchange. At the same time, though, Red Orient 
kept selling its own textile products at prices higher than the official ones, as it 
had done with Bukhgostorg. This was a very different practice, which people’s 
commissariat for internal trade (Narkomvnutorg) considered “economically 
inadmissible.”105  
 The original denomination of Red Orient included the term “trade.” This 
detail, and a specific paragraph in its statute, could indeed have served as a 
justification that this trust sold (and bought) at prices higher than those fixed by 
the Narkomvnutorg or developed a speculative trading activity “on the side.” 
However, this discussion did not concern Red Orient’s trading activity as such, 
but the fact that it took place at unregulated prices.106 The trust, however, had 
little interest in trading at the official prices. That Red Orient looked at the 
private sector more than at state organizations is clear from the fact that, out of 
the contracts it had signed until early 1925, 62% were concluded with private 
subjects, 21% with state organs, and the rest with the cooperative network.107 
Trade at unregulated prices was mentioned by the statute, but only the Bukharan 
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Economic Council had approved the latter. This meant that Red Orient could 
trade at prices other than those the Narkomvnutorg had established but only in 
deals with subjects of the Bukharan people’s republic. If it wanted to do so in the 
USSR at large, the statute had to receive the Narkomvnutorg’s endorsement – 
which was unlikely. In this respect, the accusations to which the Rabkrin was 
reacting seemed grounded. 
 There was more, though, in the allegation of “economically inadmissible” 
practices. Besides these irregularities in the trading activity of the Bukharan 
trust, and looking for motives for them, the Rabkrin noted shortcomings in the 
production itself. The first inspection of 1924 had already mentioned some of 
them (procurements, under-utilization of the machinery), and it appears that 
Beliakov had found a remedy. All in all, the conclusions this second inspection 
reached in 1925 echoed those of its predecessor: Red Orient had high costs of 
production, and it had managed to remain afloat so far either by transferring 
them onto the Bukharan trade organization or other purchasers by means of 
higher prices or by “trading on the side” in various goods, thereby securing extra 
income. Yet the circumstances and reasons for these higher costs, implicit in the 
1924 report, became explicit in 1925: technology and industrial organization 
ceased to be relevant in the narrow framework of the relations with the 
Bukhgostorg and became an object of attention as such. The second Rabkrin 
inspection, influenced by allegations by Moscow-based organizations, went well 
beyond the assessment of Red Orient’s trade practices and, with the pretext of 
looking for reasons for these allegations, unearthed a series of shortcomings in 
the way its production was organized. 
 First, labor was too abundant relative to capital: the number of workers for 
each one thousand spinning reels was higher in the Zaraiskaia fabrika than in 
any other textile factory with the exception of silk-processing ones (which used 
different technology). Moreover, while a few trusts had managed to curtail this 
number throughout the 1923-1924 economic year, Red Orient did not distinguish 
itself in this direction. The situation in weaving was not dissimilar: Red Orient 
used more labor, and, as a result, the productivity per worker (one eight-hour 
shift), as measured in meters of cloth, was about 5 percent lower than in the 
Krasno-Presnenskii and Serpukhovskii trusts.108 In addition, the 3547 workers of 
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the Zaraiskaia fabrika (out of 3695 employees) earned on average around 17 
percent more than the standard average salaries for the USSR, probably because 
of the high percentage of workers of the “upper ranks” (level 4 ½ or 5).109  
 Second, between 1924 and 1925, as we know, Red Orient had concluded a 
series of agreements to expand its production by acquiring more industrial 
plants. More exactly, it had started renting the Veniukovskaia, the 
Blagushinskaia, and the Zubovskaia factories. The idea was probably to reduce 
costs (including transaction costs) and improve quality through vertical 
integration: if the Zaraiskaia fabrika and the Zubovskaia both spun and wove, 
the Veniukovskaia would print that cloth, and the Blagushinskaia would twist, 
mercerize, and dye the yarn required for weaving it. These plans for “vertical” 
integration corresponded to what the first Rabkrin inspection suggested and were 
quite brilliant, on paper. If one is to believe Fayzulla Khojaev’s proud words, in 
the 1924-1925 economic year, 85.2 percent of the yarn woven by the Zaraiskaia, 
Zubovskaia, and Veniukovskaia factories was spun by the Zaraiskaia itself, and 
more than half of the grey cloth dyed or printed by the Veniukovskaia and 
Blaguchinskaia factories was produced within the trust (Fig. 1).110 The problem 
was that the newly acquired factories reproduced some of the shortcomings of the 
Zaraiskaia: if in the latter the roof was in bad condition, in the Blagushinskaia 
chemical substances were simply stored outdoors. In the Veniukovskaia factory 
(which was faring much better than the rest), the printing machinery was also 
under-utilized by 30 percent; in the other two, management was opaque, and 
even the renting contracts were so “legally illiterate” that the trust had to rewrite 
them again and again.111 
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 The inefficiencies that the Rabkrin inspection unearthed posed some 
important problems of responsibility, both for the management on the spot 
(Beliakov) and, on a political level, for the Bukharan (by then, Uzbek) 
government. Beliakov, against whom the Bukharan leadership had not yet taken 
any measures, had ostensibly decided what to rent without consulting the 
republican organs; he had therefore violated the statute. He tried to defend 
himself in two ways. He claimed that he had kept Fayzulla Khojaev, instead of 
Atabaev, informed of his moves. Nobody seemed to accept his version of the 
facts, as nobody had taken his allegations about a plot against him seriously some 
time before. 112  And he also used a typical Soviet discursive strategy: he put 
forward the political merits of the trust and, not without patronizing tones, 
recalled shortly before his dismissal that Red Orient had done much for the 
working class. In Zaraisk, this help had taken the form of new or restored 
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lodgings for more than 600 people and decent sanitary facilities (running water 
and heating) and at approximately one-third of the usual cost per square meter in 
the Moscow region – which casts some doubt on the quality of the workers’ 
houses and dorms (kazerny). Beliakov also pointed at educational facilities for 
the local workers, for Bukharan trainees, and even an orphanage.113  
 In sum, the routine Rabkrin inspection of 1925 revealed the situation of 
Red Orient as a “national” trade-and-industry enterprise, relative to the rest of 
the textile sector in the Moscow area at the eve of the years of “high NEP” and at 
the moment of its transition from the Bukhara people’s republic to the Uzbek 
SSR. Such position was one of weakness, vis-à-vis the Moscow stock exchange as 
well as the major trusts which voiced their concerns through it. Red Orient was 
inefficient not only in its transactions with both suppliers and clients (as the first 
Rabkrin inspection noted), but also in the way it organized the combination of 
labor and capital. The attempt to integrate the main phases of textile production 
by renting a few additional plants, however, was undermined from the beginning 
both by the plants' decayed state and the ambiguous ownership of such project of 
integration. While Fayzulla Khojaev implicitly endorsed the renting of three 
additional factories, the tepid attitude that met Beliakov’s attempt to justify his 
decision by calling Fayzulla Khojaev himself in cause suggests that, while the 
three factories represented a useful resource for political propaganda, political 
and managerial responsibilities about their acquisition were a source of mild 
embarrassment. It is not by chance that most of Red Orient’s renting agreements 
would be discontinued almost immediately afterwards. While both the Rabkrin 
inspections could reveal problems in the organization of trade and production, 
responsibilities and recipes for change remained a matter of negotiation between 
the management and the major stakeholder, namely the Bukharan leadership in 
the government of the BNSR and of the Uzbek SSR.114 
 
4.3 What the auditors saw 
Besides Rabkrin’s reports, a diagnostic tool to understand whether Beliakov was 
doing well or not was, of course, the balance sheets for Red Orient in the years 
between 1923 and 1927. These balance sheets were established with the 
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involvement of Rabkrin auditors, who intervened as inspectors and certifiers. 
Close examination of the balance sheets, however, reveals that their drafting 
process was far from a technical endeavor: the balance sheets were as much a 
matter for negotiation as the decision to rent new factories or approve a new 
industrial plan. Though the available documentation remains fragmentary, it is 
worth looking at how numbers were put together and agreed upon in order to 
understand how Rabkrin participated in all this and how it was, all in all, 
sensitive to “political” arguments (such as those mobilized by Beliakov) and to 
“national” ones (such as those the Bukharan, then Uzbek, leadership could wield 
to protect their interests). 
 Not only were some balance sheets imprecise and manipulative; the choice 
of which balance sheet one would look at is also challenging. For instance, while 
for the economic year (October to October) 1924-1925 the balance sheet that the 
top management undersigned and one Rabkrin auditor endorsed (after Beliakov 
had quit) are identical to the kopek, for 1923-1924 we have very different 
versions. In general chronological order, in the first version the income was a 
fabulous 1,371,599 rubles; 115  after the Rabkrin intervention, the bottom line 
marked a deficit of some forty-eight thousand rubles, 116  which would soon 
transmute into a 134,233 ruble gross income.117 Finally, there was an ecumenical 
version in which the balance was in perfect parity.118 To understand how this was 
possible, and to apprehend the underlying negotiations between stakeholders, 
one needs to go through the documents step by step. Doing so will reveal how the 
balance sheets for Red Orient, especially in the crucial year 1923-1924, are not a 
diagnostic tool for the health of the trust or for the responsibilities of its 
managers. On the contrary, the way the balance sheets were put together (which 
includes authorship, timing, and the decision to publish them or not) is, rather, a 
diagnostic tool for power relations between the Bukharan government, the 
management of its trust in Russia, and Soviet control agencies (e.g., Rabkrin). It 
is not at the balance sheets that we should look to understand whether Beliakov 
was wrongly dismissed or whether Fayzulla Khojaev was in good or bad faith 
when he commented on the results of “vertical integration” between the factories 
of Red Orient. 
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 The first suspicious circumstance lay in the fact that the approval of these 
balance sheets only started when more than twelve months had elapsed since the 
end of the economic year in question: snapshots of the situation on October 1, 
1924 were available only at the beginning of 1926, more or less at the same time 
as those for the following economic year. The Rabkrin had noted the abysmal 
state of accounting in 1923; on top of that, whatever the existing data may have 
shown in October 1924, there had been plenty of time to manipulate them 
between then and January 1926. This procedure has left little or no paper trail, 
but it is plausible that the highest estimate of Red Orient’s income was indeed the 
first one, and it was put together for the benefit of the Moscow Tax Commission. 
We have Beliakov’s word on this point, and he would have had no reason to lie on 
this specific aspect.119 It is true that the trust’s managers and accountants may 
have wished to underestimate its income for fiscal purposes, but the wish to show 
that the Zaraiskaia fabrika and the trade department were doing well in the first 
year of activity could have balanced this temptation. Moreover, Red Orient may 
have had no time to prepare anything reliable while the Tax Commission (unlike 
the VSNKh) could not wait for further controls to be carried out.  
 Then came the Rabkrin auditors who saw a version of the balance sheets 
which has not survived but which other documents mention. The Rabkrin experts 
found that the circulating capital (raw materials, semi-finished, and finished 
products) was overestimated; they also downsized the amount relative to the 
repairs to the Zaraiskaia fabrika, and revised the estimate of errors and 
omissions (summy do vyiasnenia). All this was quite straightforward, and the 
Uzbek VSNKh itself did not hesitate to accept these changes and to admit some of 
the shortcomings of the earlier version. But one specific point was more 
controversial: the ascription of “provisions for liabilities and charges” (fond 
rezervnyi) for some 630 thousand rubles. “Provisions” (or “reserves,” as they are 
sometimes, though less correctly, called) are sums of money that a company sets 
aside for charges or risks likely to materialize after the conclusion of the 
economic year. They appear in the balance sheets as liabilities (passiv in Russian) 
and in the expenses (debet) side of the income statement. The majority of Soviet 
balance sheets in this period do not include an income statement, only a balance 
sheet, and it will be on the latter than one needs to focus. 120  There was 
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considerable confusion over whether, and where, these “provisions” should be 
registered. It seems that the trust, with the support of the Uzbek VSNKh, had 
made an attempt to flip them from the expenditures to the receipts side in the 
income statement (and, one supposed, from liabilities to assets in the balance 
sheet). The argument they ostensibly used to justify such a heterodox operation 
was that the “provisions” had been set aside in 1922-1923 when the accountants 
had indeed registered them as liabilities. However, no documentation existed for 
1922-1923, so nobody could verify whether this had been the case, and even then, 
the maneuver would have been scarcely justifiable. The Rabkrin inspectors 
insisted on bringing the provisions back to the liabilities side; this decision erased 
the income (which, according to this draft, would have been around 582 
thousand rubles) and set the final result as a forty-eight thousand rubles deficit.121  
 Naturally, this went against the desiderata of the Uzbek VSNKh, which 
chose, however, to comply. Beliakov’s reaction was far less composed, possibly 
because his job depended on the bottom line on the balance sheet. He claimed, in 
1926, that the liabilities contained all sorts of items that did not belong there and 
that these “faked” liabilities approached 700 thousand rubles. Had the inspectors 
left them out, the result would have been much closer to the very high income 
estimate he had supplied to the Tax Commission earlier. That Beliakov himself 
was not very sure of this specific argument is patent from the fact that the Tax 
Commission was only ancillary to his many “political” arguments mentioned 
above. There was little he could do, though, since he had lost his chairmanship in 
May 1925. Khal’fin and Sheshunov, who had been the trade manager and the 
head accountant under Beliakov’s chairmanship, had been prosecuted although 
they were cleared in the end.122 The first and second Rabkrin inspections had 
found Beliakov’s management inadequate – although Bukhara hesitated for quite 
a while before dismissing him. In this sense, the discovery of this massive over-
estimation of the income of the trust may have been decisive in tilting the balance 
against him. 
 A new team, led by a F. Klimov, and including E. Rappoport and a V. 
Moszhukin as head accountant, replaced Beliakov and his acolytes in the last 
months of 1925. The Bukharan on the team, Sattar Khojaev, joined them shortly 
afterwards, probably between January and March 1926. This team undersigned a 
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further version of the balance sheet of Red Orient for 1923-1924, which the all-
Union VSNKh subsequently approved on January 21, 1926 and then published on 
February 12 in the official Torgovo-Promyshlennaia Gazeta.123 This time, the 
provisions appeared as liabilities, as the Rabkrin inspection had recommended, 
but receipts still exceeded expenditures by a substantial amount. The bottom line 
signalled an income of 134,233 rubles before taxation. The official balance was far 
less optimistic than what Beliakov had proposed and took the Rabkrin audit into 
account to some extent: it retained the principle (the ascription of provisions as 
liabilities) but tinkered with numbers enough to avoid ending up with a deficit.124 
The new management, therefore, ignored part of the recommendations of the 
Rabkrin audit and moderated others, yet they did not pay for it, and the 
Rabkrin’s auditors did not intervene to challenge this version, which became 
official. Although we do not know exactly why, or how, this is revealing of the 
relations between Rabkrin and the trust. Possibly because of an intervention of 
the all-Union VSNKh, which checked what was published in the Torgovo-
Promyshlennaia Gazeta, Klimov and the rest of the new management were able 
to opt for a compromise between the Rabkrin’s requests and the interests of their 
major stakeholder. Beliakov’s departure might have facilitated their task since 
such a compromise could then pass for a political decision in Bukhara's favor, 
rather than for indulgence towards sloppy management. Still, this is matter for 
speculation; the sources are silent about how, in practice, the official balance 
sheet was adjusted mid-way. What the sources do show is that Red Orient 
received kid glove treatment, but exactly why is uncertain. A circumstantial, 
albeit plausible, reason is that Red Orient was a “national” trust and therefore 
had a strong political and symbolic value both for Moscow and Bukhara. 
 The importance of the image of Red Orient as a “national” enterprise is 
confirmed by another circumstance. The one discussed above, characterized by a 
reasonable income, was the balance sheet for Red Orient in 1923-1924 that was 
published in the official newspaper of the VSNKh. For the internal consumption 
of the new management and the Rabkrin, however, there existed a further version 
of the balance sheet, which ended the year in perfect parity. 125 Unlike the other 
versions, this balance sheet was linked to the one for the following year (which 
ended in October 1925), during which bookkeeping was probably more 
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consistent. It was this version that concluded the paper trail of the Rabkrin 
inspection, and it was from this document that the new industrial plan for Red 
Orient moved. Although it was less severe in its conclusions than the first product 
of the Rabkrin inspection (the one that had cost Beliakov his job), it was not 
published. For everybody outside the direct stakeholders of the trust, Red Orient 
was moderately successful even during the dramatic year of the “scissors crisis.” 
 In sum, the analysis of the extant balance sheets for Red Orient in 1923-
1924 is suggestive of two circumstances. First, bookkeeping and accounting in 
1923-1924 were patchy, not only because of the shortcomings of the trust’s staff 
but also because of the peculiarities of that year, such as the monetary reform of 
early 1924. In the absence of close studies of Soviet accounting at the time, it is 
hard to say whether this was a generalized or an uncommon phenomenon – 
although one would reasonably incline for the former. But general economic 
circumstances alone do not explain the enchainment of balance-drafting, 
inspections, and changes in the management. Instead, such enchainment reflects 
a process of negotiation between Rabkrin and Red Orient’s various stakeholders 
– a process that led to greater control of the trust’s Russian factories while 
avoiding damages to its reputation. The first balance sheet after the Rabkrin 
inspection led to Beliakov's dismissal but remained unpublished. We do not know 
if it was meant to be a political tool in a reshuffling of the trust’s leadership, but it 
surely had that effect. Neither it nor the latest versions were published, though, 
or circulated beyond the shareholders and the organs of State control. The 
balance meant for external consumption was instead slightly positive, despite the 
turbulent year it referred to. It was meant to reassure clients, competing trusts, 
and above all, suppliers and to invite confidence in the new administrators who 
had publicly undersigned it. 
 
5. Red Orient as a national enterprise  
The period after the Rabkrin inspection of 1925 marked important changes for 
Red Orient: first, the reshuffling of its leadership; then, a new industrial plan 
inspired by principles of rationalization and cost-cutting, as the Rabkrin 
recommended; last, a greater engagement of the major stakeholder (by then, the 
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government of the Uzbek SSR) to protect its business interests, improve results, 
and strengthen the link between the textile trust, with its Russian factories, and 
the Uzbek cotton sector. Such engagement – and the investment of political 
capital that went with it – was somewhat different from that of the leaders of the 
BNSR in previous years. The nazirs had called for the intervention of the 
Peasants’ and Workers’ Inspection to protect the interests of its trade 
organization, Bukhgostorg, and might have toasted at Beliakov's dismissal. 
Despite the continued centrality of Bukharans in dealing with Red Orient, the 
Uzbek government increasingly considered the trust crucial for its industrial 
interests and strove to orient its purchases, its production, and its sales in a way 
that would favor the republic’s national interests. It was ready to play the 
“national” card vis à vis Moscow-based institutions, despite and against the fact 
that the management of the trust itself was sometimes following different 
incentives. These attempts increasingly clashed against the move towards 
centralized industrial planning and the syndicalization of trade and ultimately 
metamorphosed into the revived project for a textile plant in the Uzbek SSR 
itself. 
 
5.1 New wine in old barrels: the 1925 industrial plan  
Beliakov was replaced by F. Klimov (chair of the board), E. Rappoport (a new 
accountant), and a Bukharan, Sattar Khojaev. While we know little about Klimov 
and the new accountant, the choice of Sattar Khojaev and Rappoport raised some 
objections. In particular, the Rabkrin received an anonymous letter in 1926 in 
which Rappoport was described as “having just come out of prison” and Sattar 
Khojaev as “a notorious thief, expelled from the Bukharan territory, an infamous 
[former] people’s commissar of finance, who ha[d] plundered the national riches 
of the Bukharan republic.”126 This latter allegation seemed to have its roots in the 
fact that Sattar Khojaev, formerly head of the Financial Administration of the 
BNSR, had gone on trial in 1923 for embezzlement of public money. His 
prosecution and his exclusion from the Bukharan government, however, must be 
seen as part of a wider purge which occurred in June 1923, as we saw with Ata-
Khojaev. As had happened to him, by becoming part of the team in charge of the 
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re-launch of Red Orient, Sattar Khojaev was given a chance to reinvent himself, 
although physically far from Bukharan (by then: Uzbek) politics.127  
 Some of these accusations may have been Beliakov’s last poisoned gift, but 
they also reflect the controversial nature of the new management. Klimov and his 
fellows, possibly pressured by the Rabkrin, had taken some draconian measures: 
they reduced the number of management staff, dismissed all the various 
sovkhozy that depended on the trust, and increased the general productivity of 
labor in both weaving and spinning (but without lowering the number of workers 
per reel or loom). They also refused to continue to rent the Blagushinskaia and 
Zubovskaia factories, which were in such pitiful condition that Red Orient had 
trouble transferring them to other organizations, either directly or through the 
MSNKh.128 This marked the end of the “vertical integration” of different phases of 
the manufacturing chain – an end which Beliakov had partly anticipated when, 
already fallen in disgrace, he was looking for rapid sources of cash: he advertised 
Red Orient’s yarn, instead of using all of it on the trust’s own looms (see Fig. 2 
below, left).129 The output grew, and so did the share of it which was sold to state 
organizations, which rocketed to 90.5 percent in the first six months after the 
Rabkrin audit’s deliberations. Output sold through private channels plummeted 
to 9.5 percent, with sales in Uzbekistan accounting for more than half of it, and 
those in the former Khivan republic (where Soviet rule was little more than 
nominal) for as much as one-third.130 Sales to the private sector further decreased 
to 3.1 percent for the fabric and 7.8 percent for the yarn in 1926. 131 The shift in 
the markets Red Orient was targeting was ambiguous: it is doubtful if the 
majority of its output even reached the Central Asian market. For one thing, the 
new management cut Red Orient’s own warehouses and shops in Uzbekistan; the 
only real estate the trust retained was its prestigious Moscow office (otdelenie) on 
the Varvarka (in the Gostinnyi Dvor).132 
 The Rabkrin decision of June 1925 included directives on Red Orient’s 
relations with both its suppliers and its “customers” – both seen from the 
viewpoint of the spinning, weaving, and printing sectors of the trest. Inevitably, 
the same problems that had characterized these relations in previous years would 
materialize again and emerged first in the production of yarn and then in the way 
Red Orient obtained non-dyed (grey) cloth (surovye) for printing. These issues 
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derived from the producers’ (and consumers’) difficulty in handling means of 
payment, which was a characteristic feature of the NEP economy. This difficulty 
could lead to additional transaction costs and indirect costs for the settlement of 
disputes. One way of dealing with this was to minimize monetary transactions by 
building up tight credit relations with one’s suppliers. With the new industrial 
plan, Red Orient tried to do so, relying both on pre-existing ties with the 
Egor’evskii trust for the sale of yarn and on new agreements for this supply of 
grey cloth (surovye) for its printing sector. In one case, this strategy was 
successful; in the other, Red Orient succumbed.  
 The new chair of the board, Klimov, tried to minimize monetary 
transactions by pushing Red Orient to become a subcontractor for the printing of 
calicoes. This was the opposite of what the trust had attempted one year before 
when it had rented the Blagushinskaia factory. On the other hand, this was a 
strategy Beliakov himself had tried when he made a final desperate effort to 
balance the books for 1923-1924 by collecting orders for printing and dyeing 
cloth woven by other enterprises. According to the new plan, a way to maximize 
the use of the available machinery of the Zaraiskaia and Veniukovskaia factories 
without increasing the expenditure for raw materials would have been to operate 
on behalf of other enterprises. The Veniukovskaia would provide the raw 
materials (daval’cheskii tovar) itself: in this case, grey cloth.133 This move would 
have helped the weaving and printing sectors, but it would not have simplified 
the life of the spinning one; moreover, it would have fragmented Red Orient’s 
different activities even further. Last, Klimov’s plan was about to fail, at least 
initially, because the suppliers of grey cloth were unwilling to subcontract the 
printing to Red Orient, given its recent track record (or what was known of it).134 
Despite this, this model seems to have worked, at least until the end of 1927 when 
Red Orient (and the Veniukovskaia factory in particular) found themselves again 
running the printing machinery below their full capacity because the non-dyed 
cloth promised by those multiple third parties had not been delivered.135 The 
same bottlenecks evident in the first year and a half of activity of the trust came 
up again but perhaps reflect the inefficiency of the NEP system in allocating 
resources more than Red Orient’s own shortcomings. 
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 There was another way the scarcity of means of payment could be dealt 
with. Thanks to the complexity of Soviet bureaucratic architecture, this situation 
generated grey areas where, to paraphrase David Shearer, a good deal of 
“wheeling and dealing” could occur.136 One could try to bypass or minimize 
monetary transaction, or one could appeal to administrative and political forums. 
The notion of “who owed what to whom” could become diluted, instead of 
emerging clearly as it would in a normal dispute resolution. The ambiguity and 
strain which surrounded debt-credit relations, however, could open up 
opportunities for advancing political arguments. In the controversy over the 
payment of yarn by the Egor’evskii trust, Red Orient’s adversary appealed to an 
administrative forum, which in turn created a window for the Uzbek SSR to 
defend its trust. The problems Red Orient was facing were old, as old as the 
controversy that opposed it to the Egor’evskii. The way the government of the 
Uzbek SSR intervened to defend the interests of its trust, however, was now 
different from what the BNSR had done, both for the intensity of such an 
engagement and for the language that framed it.  
 Since its origin, Red Orient had been selling much of its yarn production to 
the large and powerful Egor’evskii trest, which had been one of the founders of 
the former but had soon pulled out of it. The controversy that opposed the 
Egor’evskii and Red Orient was long-standing: when the new management came 
in after the Rabkrin inspection, the case was being reviewed by an arbitration 
commission of the all-Union Labor and Defence Council (STO in acronym). The 
way the commission and the Uzbek government handled this controversy 
exemplifies how nationality was used to influence the outcome of tensions 
between business partners who were otherwise hostile to each other.  
In November 1925, in balancing the complex debt-and-credit relations that 
linked Red Orient and the Egor’evskii trust, the STO arbitration commission 
ordered Red Orient to pay some 144 thousand rubles – a considerable amount, 
more than double the income for the preceding economic year. The commission 
had no particular reason for animosity against the Uzbek trust; at the same time, 
it was taking a strong stance in favor of Red Orient about the supply of some 
textiles for the Solovki labor camp, which the OGPU considered inferior quality.137 
At this point, after this decision in favor of the Egor’evskii trust had become 
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public, the representative of the Uzbek SSR in Moscow (but, importantly, not the 
management of the trust) appealed against it, asking to curtail the amount due by 
about a third. The Egor’evskii resisted this attempt: in its view, the Uzbek 
government had no right to meddle in the affairs of the two companies who were 
the only subjects legitimately able to appeal the commission’s decision. This 
episode came to an end only in February 1926, when another all-Union 
government commission ruled the protest of the Uzbek government out of order. 
However, this second commission decided against Red Orient, not because of the 
form of the first appeal by the Uzbek government (that is, not for the reason that 
the Egor’evskii had mentioned) but because of the content matter under 
discussion. Even more significantly, the commission ruled against the appeal of 
the Uzbek government, therefore recognizing that the Uzbek government could 
indeed appeal. In this way, it not only denied the validity of the opponent’s 
formal exception; it also implicitly stated that it was acceptable for a republican 
government to intervene in support of its own national trust in all-Union forums 
of arbitration. 138  
 In sum, the Uzbek government intervened to support its trust, using its 
political leverage even though the trust was, in theory, an autonomous 
organization. It did so despite the attitude of the management of Red Orient on 
the spot, which did not raise any objection to the commission’s original 
deliberations. From the viewpoint of Moscow-based organs (but possibly thanks 
to Kuibyshev’s personal involvement), 139  the all-Union STO, through its 
arbitration commission, did not exclude this possibility. This suggests that the 
Uzbek SSR regarded Red Orient as a strategic national asset and was ready to use 
its political weight within the Soviet system to assert this idea; it also suggests 
that the central organs, such as the STO, did not regard this behavior as 
abnormal. It is also true, though, that the “national card” alone was not an 
absolute trump: on the subject matter, the STO commission sided with the 
Egor’evskii trust nonetheless. 
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5.2 Whose cotton? Procurements and sales. 
After the Rabkrin inquiry, Red Orient and the Uzbek government attempted to 
build new connections between the trust and the Central Asian market. The trust 
sometimes relied on the support of the politicians to foster its interests in this 
respect; in other cases, it was the republican administration that highlighted the 
special “national” nature of Red Orient in order to contain the influence of the 
Central Cotton Committee and other procurement agencies in the countryside. 
There were two closely connected terrains on which Red Orient portrayed itself 
(and was portrayed) as a “national” trust, endowed with a special liaison with 
Central Asia: the procurement of ginned cotton for the spindling sector of the 
trust (concentrated in the Zaraiskaia factory) and the distribution of textile 
goods to the peasants so that they were, in turn, encouraged to expand the 
cultivation of cotton. The confrontation between Red Orient and the Uzbek 
government on one hand, and the all-Union VSNKh and the Cotton Committee 
on the other, was part of a wider battle around the role of the latter in Central 
Asia, which took place between 1924 and 1927 and involved the Central Asian 
Bureau, as well as the banking sector.140 
 The national delimitation, more than the new industrial plan of 1925, 
changed the institutional chain through which any textile trust obtained ginned 
cotton. In addition, between 1923 and 1925, the way the cultivation of cotton took 
place in Central Asia and the way the peasantry sold their cotton harvest also 
underwent significant transformations. In the first years of its activity, Red 
Orient had to rely on private suppliers or, alternatively, on the Bukhgostorg. In 
1925, and even more so later, the Central Cotton Committee (Glavkhlopkom) had 
managed to bring under its control the greater part of cotton production in the 
newly constituted Uzbek SSR, which was also a larger producer than the 
Bukharan people’s republic alone used to be. In the USSR, the Cotton Committee 
operated in practice (but not de jure) as a monopolist. The only possible 
alternative to the purchase of cotton from it, or from its republican branches, was 
to buy imported cotton from another organization, the all-Union Textile 
Syndicate (VTS in acronym). The VTS only allowed fifty-five days of credit to pay 
for the cotton while the Glavkhlopkom conceded delays up to three months. The 
management of Red Orient, though, qualified the Cotton Committee’s terms to 
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Red Orient as “literally extortionate” (bukval’no kabal’nye), if compared to those 
the Committee applied to other, larger textile trusts. This happened because Red 
Orient had to buy at credit because, as a consequence of its systematic under-
capitalization, it did not possess enough liquidity to do otherwise. To buy at 
credit, the Uzbek trust had to recur to Aziabank, which provided the necessary 
guarantees, for instance on the trust’s letters of credit. Aziabank’s conditions 
were particularly harsh, especially because the bank used ginned cotton as 
collateral, transferring the additional costs (storage, etc.) to the debtor.141 The 
Central Cotton Committee would have given up all additional banking guarantees 
it was asking from Red Orient on one condition: that Red Orient sold its entire 
textile production to the Cotton Committee itself so that the latter could 
distribute it to the peasants through the Committee’s own network.  
 After long hesitation, the board of Red Orient finally decided, in Autumn 
1925, to embrace these conditions and to be supplied by the Central Cotton 
Committee with cotton from Fergana.142 The trust, however, hoped that the Uzbek 
VSNKh would intervene to soften the Committee, given the republic’s role as a 
cotton producer – a hope that was unlikely to be fulfilled, as the relations 
between the Uzbek republic and the Khlopkom were not at their best in 1925 and 
1926.143 Red Orient was also expecting some help from the Uzbek government in 
its deals with Aziabank, not only on the side of cotton supplies but also for the 
distribution of its textile output in Central Asia. Red Orient was quite ready to use 
its position as a “national trust” of the Uzbek SSR as political leverage in its 
business negotiations, even when no Soviet state organs were involved (e.g., the 
STO). In dealing with the Cotton Committee, Red Orient was much more vocal 
and energetic than it had been against the Egor’evskii trust. It did not exert 
pressure directly but mobilized (or tried to mobilize) organs of the Uzbek SSR.  
 Conversely, the government of the Uzbek SSR tried to use Red Orient as a 
spearhead to regain some control over the destiny of the republic’s output of 
ginned cotton. In the name of the “Uzbekness” of the trust, in August 1926 the 
Uzbek Sovnarkom asked the all-Union VSNKh to allow Red Orient to buy cotton 
directly from the Uzbek branch of the Cotton Committee, Uzbekkhlopok, instead 
of obtaining it through the centralized provisioning system. Uzbekkhlopok was, in 
practice, the monopolist purchaser of all the raw cotton grown in the republic, 
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and it was in charge of its ginning, pressing, and shipping. But Uzbekkhlopok, 
unlike Red Orient, was not an authentic “national” enterprise; the participation 
of the Central Cotton Committee (and, through it, of the VSNKh) in its capital 
was higher than that of the Uzbek SSR itself. Instead, the Uzbek SSR had a firm 
grasp on Red Orient. The establishment of a special link between the “national” 
cotton procurement agency and the “national” textile industry (that is, between 
Uzbekkhlopok and Red Orient) would have indirectly allowed the Uzbek 
government to later exert more influence on the former by arranging prices, 
payment conditions, and so on. In addition, this link would have had a strong 
symbolic value by ensuring that at least a part of the republic’s cotton was spun 
and woven on the republic’s own spindles and looms, instead of getting lost in the 
cauldron of domestic and imported raw materials that the all-Union directorate 
for the textile industry (Glavtekstil’) was managing. The VSNKh, the Labor and 
Defense Council (STO), and the all-Union Sovnarkom, though, rejected this 
proposal, ostensibly without explanation. 144  Such a move towards 
decentralization in the supply of textile raw materials was diametrically opposed 
to the plans of VSNKh, not only for Red Orient but also for other trusts. The 
attempt to link the Uzbek production of cotton as a raw material to the incipient 
Uzbek textile industry through the bias of a privileged link with the supposedly 
national procurement agency, Uzbekkhlopok, ultimately failed because, unlike 
Red Orient, Uzbekkhlopok was solidly in the hands of an all-Union organization, 
the very powerful Central Cotton Committee. 
 A further reason for trying to establish this link was the need to supply 
adequate textile goods, at the most appropriate time, for Uzbekistani rural 
consumers. In this respect, Red Orient and its Uzbek stakeholders were more 
successful. In particular, on the occasion of the harvest, Uzbek peasants received 
money they were not able to spend: a circumstance that generated conjunctural 
inflation. Furthermore, the absence of goods for purchase made the peasants wait 
for cotton prices to rise later in autumn and winter before selling their harvest 
and dissuaded them from sowing more cotton in the following spring. In sum, an 
adequate supply of palatable textiles was essential to recover and expand pre-war 
levels of raw cotton production in Central Asia. The Cotton Committee, and in 
particular Uzbekkhlopok, was responsible for this and had an interest in seeing 
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that the operation was successful. Yet besides the obvious difficulties in reaching 
out to the most remote localities and fighting against private retailers, 
Uzbekkhlopok had to face the issue of the inferior fabric and cloth available to the 
peasants. In theory, the Uzbek trust Red Orient had specialized in weaving cloth 
for the Central Asian market, but this remained doubtful even after the Rabkrin 
audit of 1925. For instance, after June 1925, the trust stated that it would reorient 
its sales towards the Central Asian market, raising their share from 14.7 to 54.4 
percent of the total output. 145 This represented a shift from what had been the 
practice, if not the official line, of the trest itself under Beliakov’s management 
when the Zaraiskaia factory looked essentially at the Russian market, producing 
cloth “in a variety of superior Asian-style patterns” (see Fig. 2 below).146 Later in 
1926, though, the Uzbek government reported that Red Orient was still selling 
the majority of its output in European Russia. This statement might have been 
imprecise, but it reflected either the fact that Red Orient’s production was 
scarcely visible on the Uzbek market or that the Uzbek government wanted its 
presence to grow. Other sources show that, if textiles from Red Orient managed 
to reach the Central Asian consumer, it was often through Russian-based private 
dealers or Russian trade organizations which had purchased it from one of the 
many concessionaries of the trust in European Russia.147 With the new industrial 
plan of 1925, almost all these concessionaries (otdeleniia) closed down, which 
constituted both a challenge and an opportunity to sell to Central Asia more 
directly. At the same time, though, Red Orient had also sold its warehouses in 
Uzbekistan. A new strategy to make Red Orient textiles available to the Central 
Asian peasant was needed. 
 Red Orient could expand its distribution network in Central Asia, or it 
could stipulate contracts with Uzbek trade organizations -- for instance with 
Uzbektorg or the union of co-operatives (Uzbekberlash) -- or it could conclude 
deals with the organizations that carried out cotton procurements in the 
countryside so that its textile products could be available directly to the peasants 
these were crediting. This latter solution had one shortcoming: it would make 
Red Orient dependent on the same partner for both the supply of raw materials 
and the sales of its finished products. But it had many advantages too: only 
cotton organizations possessed a capillary presence on the territory, especially in 
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the Uzbek SSR; moreover, they had considerable liquidity and could pay Red 
Orient without asking for long credit.  
 This second point was particularly evident by comparison with its 
alternative: that of concluding deals with Uzbek trade organizations. Uzbektorg 
was systematically illiquid and its network was ineffective. It had accumulated 
debts with banks and other economic organizations, and in 1926 the only way out 
seemed to be its recapitalization, by which the Cotton Committee would have 
attracted it into its orbit. The co-operatives were in no better financial health.148 
Negotiations with these organizations started under the new board chaired by 
Klimov and implicitly aimed at the establishment of Red Orient’s “commodity 
base” (tovarnaia baza) in Tashkent. 149  Two principles inspired them and 
reflected the small room available for concessions:  
 
1) in selling goods to Central Asian economic organizations, we will 
need to credit them only for up to 75 percent of their value, because the 
Central Asian market, overflowing with money at the moment of the 
raw cotton procurements, can easily pay for those goods in cash, 
provided that we get close to the consumers without intermediaries; 2) 
the conquest of the Central Asian market and the acquisition of a 
permanent set of costumers for Red Orient, [because] direct 
transactions with the latter on the ground will give it [scil. the trust] the 
opportunity to be less dependent on the trade policy of the above 
mentioned economic organization.150  
 
As a result of these negotiations, by January 1926, Red Orient had already 
excluded Uzgostorg from the list of its local partners, allegedly because Uzgostorg 
refused to accept its conditions. Red Orient had also ruled out working with other 
organizations, such as the Uzbek silk trest (Turkshëlk). Discussions continued in 
early 1926, only with the Uzbek league of co-operatives, Uzbekberliash, and 
there, again, Red Orient tried to play the politics card. It asked the Uzbek VSNKh 
to exert pressure on Uzbekberliash so that it accepted its conditions and also on 
Aziabank in order to secure more credit for Red Orient’s own operations with the 
league of co-operatives.151 For these reasons, by the 1926 cotton harvest, the 
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Uzbek council of people’s commissars preferred a direct connection between Red 
Orient and the Cotton Committee for the distribution of the former’s 
production.152 
 If Red Orient and its Uzbek stakeholders were not successful in 
establishing a link with the republic for the procurement of raw materials, they 
were relatively more successful in progressively orienting the trust’s output 
towards the Central Asian market, although this had to be done through the 
Cotton Committee. This move towards the periphery, so to say, was part of a 
general reorientation process that Red Orient started in 1925 and continued in 
the following years. Based on the available balance sheets from 1923 to 1927, this 
seems to have been a wise choice. It was thanks to this move that the Uzbek trust 
managed to retain some margins of autonomy in the distribution of textiles on 
the Soviet internal market. The all-Union VSNKh, though, fiercely opposed these 
reorientation plans. In the first months of 1926, the VSNKh ordered an inquiry 
about the destinations of Red Orient’s finished products which the trust had been 
unable to distribute since 1925. This inquiry allegedly unearthed an 
“unsatisfactory trade activity” where “work [was] taking place without any order,” 
to the point that finished products never left the plant’s sheds “despite the 
favorable market conjuncture and the increasing demand for manufactured 
products.” Further, the VSNKh claimed that relations between the Uzbek trust 
and Uzbek trade organizations were somewhat neglected. Therefore, in May 
1926, the VSNKh proposed that Red Orient transfer all its output to the VTS, 
which would distribute it in the Uzbek republic, not within, but on top of its 
dispatching (“import”) plans. Moreover, the VSNKh threatened to take the 
management of Red Orient away from the Uzbek government if it did not quickly 
resolve the issue of accumulated excess finished products.153 Red Orient evidently 
solved this problem under the new management of P.B. Rudini (surely not an 
Uzbek). The VSNKh’s press organ, the Torgovo-Promyshlennaia Gazeta, had 
denounced the scandal of unsold stocks on May 22, but by the end of the same 
month, Rudini had managed to sweep them all away, thereby saving Red Orient 
from being severed from the Uzbek SSR. This is so extraordinary that one cannot 
help finding it suspicious.154 This specific outcome, the alleged rapidity of the 
solution to the excess stocks problem, and the manifest satisfaction of the VSNKh 
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suggest that the question of excess stocks could have been a pretext to replace the 
management of the trust and, by these means, to discourage Red Orient from 
acquiring an additional factory.  
 In autumn 1926, again, the VSNKh prompted an offensive aiming at the 
“syndicalization” of all cloth and fabric sales. All trusts, in particular the smaller 
ones, had to start selling all their production to the VTS. This did not concern Red 
Orient specifically, as had been the case in the previous months, but it would 
have indirectly affected its attempts to orient its production to the Central Asian 
market through the cultivation of appropriate relations with local retail networks. 
If Red Orient managed to temporarily escape the “syndicalization,” it was 
paradoxically because of two of its weaknesses: first, it was so small that it 
managed to temporarily ignore the orders to confer its output to the VTS and to 
participate in its capital; second, its production costs were too high and led to 
prices well above the target set by VTS.155 (The clear proximity between Rudini 
and the VSNKh might have helped, too.) In sum, at the end of 1926, Red Orient 
was allowed to continue its sales in Central Asia, as recognized under Klimov’s 
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Fig. 2 – Advertisements for Red Orient in the TPG.156 
 
5.3 A new Muscovite factory to satisfy Central Asian demand 
Red Orient's negligible output, though, was also an obstacle for the trust’s 
intention to orient its production to the Central Asian market because such 
output could satisfy only a fraction of the Uzbek domestic demand of textiles, 
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however good the distribution network might have become with the help of the 
co-operative network or through the Cotton Committee. Its production was little 
more than one-twentieth of the output of the largest textile trust of the Soviet 
Union at the time, the Ivanovo-Vosnesenskii, and little more than one-fifth that 
of its direct competitor, the Egor’ev-Ramenskii trust. Even more irritating was 
the comparison with the Turkmen textile trust – which was a more appropriate 
benchmark. Turkmenmanufaktura, as it was called, was similar to Red Orient in 
that its production was concentrated in the Moscow region (Reutovskaia 
factory), yet it produced almost twice as much cloth as its Uzbek equivalent.157 It 
was natural that the trust itself, and the Uzbek government behind it, was looking 
for means to expand the output of printed and non-printed cloth. At first, though, 
they did not express a precise preference where this expansion should physically 
take place.158  
 Not far from the Veniukovskaia factory, Red Orient’s flagship plant in the 
Moscow region, stood other factories and mills. One of them, the Boriso-
Lopasnenskaia, had been mothballed as early as 1921. Someone else might have 
coveted and managed to acquire it later in the early 1920s, but in 1925 it was 
again in the process of being dismantled; hence, it was reasonable that the Uzbek 
trust would try to acquire it or, at least, purchase its looms (for a total of some 
900 units) which were then sitting idle in what was ostensibly a rotting 
building. 159  The Uzbek government supported Red Orient in this endeavor, 
particularly in its negotiations with the Economic Council of the Moscow region 
(MSNKh). The MSNKh was inclined to favor the larger Egor’evskii trust which 
was also active in the Moscow region and had, as we know, a long history of tense 
relations with Red Orient.  
 Negotiations with the MSNKh about the destiny of those 900 looms 
started in March 1925 but advanced slowly and finally came to a halt in 1926.160 A 
series of local economic and political organizations, such as the uezd and 
guberniia sections of the trade union representing textile factory workers, as well 
as the planning commission of the Moscow guberniia (Gubplan), had approved 
the transfer of all the machinery of the Boriso-Lopasnenskaia factory to Red 
Orient. But more powerful patrons backed the MSNKh: the VSNKh and even 
more its chairman, É.I. Kviring. The latter intervened personally to favor the 
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Egor’evskii trust. In the summer of 1926, together with the Presidium of VSNKh, 
he swore that he would speak out in case the MSNKh stopped resisting the joint 
pressures of Red Orient's management and the Uzbek representative in Moscow, 
Rozental’. The controversy between the two sides lay in the interpretation of the 
task the all-Union plan for the textile industry had assigned to the trust in 
question. According to the Uzbek side, an upgrade of production capacity from 
2000 to 2500 pieces per day was compatible with the plan while the MSNKh and 
its allies claimed that Red Orient had already exceeded its quota of production.161  
It appears that, in the discussion about the Boriso-Lopasnenskaia 
factory's destiny, the bone of contention had more to do with perspective than 
numbers. The main argument Red Orient could wield against its adversaries was 
that, whatever the numbers, the plan clearly defined some strategic task: the trust 
had to supply adequate provisions to the Uzbek internal market in order to satisfy 
its growing demand for cotton cloth. The Uzbek side could argue that, by 
expanding its productivity in the Moscow region, the trust could use the excess 
yarn already on its premises, which it could not have easily absorbed without the 
extra looms of the new Boriso-Lopasnenskaia factory. The VSNKh, on the 
contrary, admitted that it was looking at the interests of “the local industry of the 
RSFSR” [sic: not those of the USSR as a whole]. Possibly with an eye on the 
Egor’evskii trust, the VSNKh felt that, if Red Orient had acquired yarn it could 
not use, then other weaving plants should receive it. Moreover, it was easy for 
Kviring to dismiss the Uzbeks’ main argument about the will of Red Orient to do 
its bit to satisfy the Central Asian demand for textile goods. With newly received 
data in hand, the VSNKh, in spring 1926, could point out that the share of Red 
Orient’s output which was actually sold in Uzbekistan, after a promising 
beginning in the summer of 1925, had plummeted in the first quarter of the fiscal 
year 1925-1926 (October-December) to become no more than 25 percent of the 
total. 162 With these arguments, in July 1926 the VSNKh dismissed the trust’s 
requests to acquire the Boriso-Lopasnenskaia's looms to better serve its Central 
Asian clients.163  
 The problem for the VSNKh was not that Red Orient would have exceeded 
its production quota if it had acquired the additional looms: one can see it from 
the fact that the output of the trust increased under Rudini’s management 
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because the Veniukovskaia factory intensified the usage of the machinery it 
already possessed.164 What mattered to the VSNKh and the MSNKh was who 
would get the 900 looms. In a broader perspective, these organs could justify 
these choices in terms of rationalization of the textile sector in the Moscow region 
in order to better exploit economies of scale. 165  In the end, though, the 
controversial Boriso-Lopasnenskaia factory was abandoned and never resumed 
work under either of the trusts which had coveted it in the 1920s. Instead, Red 
Orient continued to weave and print at the Veniukovskaia factory, which, in 1933 
(with a different ownership), became a mechanical plant for the production of 
loom components.166 It is nonetheless significant that, in the struggle for the 900 
looms of the Boriso-Lopasnenskaia factory, both sides (the Uzbek trust and the 
VSNKh) used the argument of the supposedly special tie between Red Orient and 
the Central Asian market: the former, to state the need for an expanded and more 
suitable production that would satisfy local rural costumers; the latter, to accuse 
Red Orient of incompetence in supplying such market and, therefore, to 
demonstrate the uselessness of such an increase in output. If one believes the 
VSNKh’s official journal, Red Orient was not putting enough energy into its 
mission of supplying Central Asian consumers. The initial promise of the Klimov 
chairmanship had given way to more ambiguous results – probably because of 
circumstances rather than the management’s faults. Throughout 1926 and 1927, 
when the push for the “syndicalization” of sales grew, the VSNKh continued to 
raise the question of the supposed irregularities in Red Orient’s sales to 
Uzbekistan. All in all, the “national” argument made Red Orient vulnerable 
because it invited possible adversaries to scrutinize the share of its production 
effectively sold in Uzbekistan. Yet the same argument could provide a shield for 
otherwise economically dubious managerial decisions or legitimize the existence 
of the trust, which came under threat by the beginning of 1927. At the time, in the 
framework of the generalized move towards a greater centralization of industrial 
planning, the Uzbek republic’s share in the capital of Red Orient (as well as that 
of the Turkmen SSR in Turkmenmanufaktura) was in danger of being liquidated 
and transferred to a Moscow-based organization, for instance the VSNKh. This 
prompted a reaction from the representative of the Uzbek government in the 
capital who, in the name of the “national” nature of the trust, managed to turn 
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this issue into a political matter and thereby secure the support of the all-Union 
Party against the VSNKh.167 This episode, however, demonstrated that it was time 
for Red Orient (and for the Uzbek government behind it) to cultivate its”national” 
orientation differently. 
 
6. How Red Orient went native  
In 1922, the Bukharan People’s Republic was offered a set of industrial assets 
located in Russia. Probably because of the costs of shipping machinery and the 
construction of new buildings, the Bukharan government decided that the textile 
factory, which constituted the most interesting of these assets, both materially 
and symbolically, could remain where it was. Its activity, however, would be 
supervised by the republic and its shop-floor would become a training ground for 
Central Asian textile workers. This factory became the core of Red Orient. Despite 
the difficulties and shortcomings discussed earlier, the trust managed to survive 
and, in a couple of years, to prosper, thanks to a blend of shrewd trade operations 
(bordering on illegality) and political arguments. Its small dimensions also 
helped it escape the attention of top-level economic organs, such as the all-Union 
Textile Syndicate (VTS) and the VSNKh. When this was not possible any more, 
Red Orient and the Uzbek government behind it changed the way they defined 
the trust’s “national” identity: from supplier of textiles to the cotton-growing 
peasantry, to provider of training and expertise for the construction of the first 
cotton textile factory in the Uzbek republic itself. 
 The establishment of a modern, mechanized cotton textile factory in 
Central Asia was an unprecedented event. Even though – and because – the 
economy of the Uzbek SSR was, and would long remain, predominantly based on 
agriculture, such a new factory represented a symbolic turning point and 
acquired a political meaning that went well beyond its material output or the 
number of workers it employed. The factory embodied the commitment of the 
Soviet government to the economic development of Central Asia as part of its 
wider socialist transformation. Some in Moscow might have seen this factory as 
nothing more than tokenism: the year it opened its doors was also the year Stalin 
announced the goal of cotton autarky for the USSR. It is hard to say if the 
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political men in the Uzbek republic extolled the new factory because they truly 
believed it represented the beginning of more diversified economic development 
or because they saw it as the sugar coating for the commitment to cotton 
monoculture. Either way, the factory Red Orient helped to establish was indeed 
something new, relative to what textile production in Central Asia had been until 
then, so that the factory itself represented a political currency expendable at 
various levels. To apprehend such novelty, we need to understand the state of 
textile production and consumption in Central Asia before 1917 and in the years 
between the revolution and the moment when Red Orient went native. 
6.1 Central Asian textiles under early Soviet rule 
It is generally thought that the Russian imperial government prevented the 
establishment of textile mills in Central Asia and therefore (unintentionally or 
deliberately) condemned this region to devote itself to agriculture and, 
ultimately, to Prebisch-style dependence on the Russian industrial center. 
Leaving aside the problem of the State-driven nature of Central Asian de-
industrialization for a moment, it is the thesis of de-industrialization itself that 
has not been adequately tested. Historiography has exclusively focused on the 
absence of large textile mills while we have no study at all on labor-intensive 
small industry in Turkestan and the protectorates in the 19th and early 20th 
century.168 While our knowledge of the history of local industrial business in pre-
revolutionary Turkestan might eventually advance to the same level as that of 
enterprises in the European parts of the empire, until now this has remained an 
almost unexplored field. This is partly because of the scarcity of accessible 
sources but also because the idea of native industrial entrepreneurship fitted 
awkwardly in Soviet narrations of backwardness and modern nationalist 
narratives of victimhood.  
 The widespread belief that there was a law of the Tsarist state that 
prohibited textile mills in Turkestan is false. 169 Soviet historiography has over-
emphasized a single statement by governor-general Samsonov opposing the 
establishment of a textile factory but has carefully avoided mentioning that the 
imperial government felt differently and that Samsonov’s statement had no legal 
foundation.170 Indeed, Soviet historian Maks I. Veksel’man argues that the few 
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doubts that governor-generals (and, far less often, imperial ministries) did 
express on the advent of textile plants in Turkestan had to do with the 
entrepreneurs involved. These were either foreigners or those unable to exercise 
full property rights or own real estate according to Russian law.171 We should 
therefore question the assumption that, since no textile plant was established in 
Turkestan before 1916, it was due to the central imperial government's opposition 
to the industrial development of the colony. Besides, industry did exist in 
Turkestan before the revolution: besides numerous ginning plants and cotton-
seed oil presses, one of the first industrial plants in Central Asia was a wool 
spinning and weaving factory in Semirechie, along the Kargaly stream, not far 
from present-day Almaty. 172  The small income that resulted from such an 
industrial sector might be a cause, rather than a consequence, of the emphasis 
that entrepreneurs and politicians put on cotton agriculture: they might have 
simply considered it more profitable than substantial investments in industry.  
 By causing the temporary isolation of Turkestan and disrupting the 
exchange pattern between the region and Russia, the revolution and civil war 
fostered the expansion of the local small-scale textile industry, including the 
spinning and weaving of cotton. This move, though interesting in itself, was not 
enough to fully satisfy local demand. Providing the Turkestani peasantry with 
cheap fabric was essential both economically and politically if the new Soviet 
regime wanted to gain control of the countryside and obtain cotton from it. For 
instance, in January 1919, Orenburg was on the front line of the civil war, and, 
while transit of manufactures for Turkestan through Samara was a possible 
alternative, it was largely frustrated by the destruction of important bridges 
across the Volga. Before the thaw, the Bolsheviks could lay rails on the ice: “every 
second need[ed] to be put to use,” as the head of the trade unions of the Ivanovo 
textile region, Vasilii S. Smirnov, reminded his comrades. Smirnov also ordered 
that they should compromise and negotiate with those who had power in 
Turkestan, even if they were not perfectly aligned, because, without adequate 
provision of grain and, above all, textiles, Russia would lose control of Central 
Asia and its cotton. 173  One year later, although communication between 
Turkestan and European Russia had been restored, the provision of textiles was 
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still insufficient. This gravely undermined the prestige of Bolshevik rule, as an 
alarmed radiogram reminded, among others, the Moscow-based Glavtekstil’:174 
 
Already four months have elapsed since the incorporation of Turkestan 
into Russia, but not a single arshin of fabric has arrived. All our 
promises in front of the Muslim population are turning into empty 
words, we are losing all authority, as we have no real possibility to 
forestall the approaching time, when we will not give any fabric to the 
peasants, who have been twice cheated by false assurances.  
 
Even when textile products reached Turkestan, basmachi armed bands and 
continuing transport difficulties ensured that only a small percentage of them (no 
more than one-third in Spring 1920) could actually be distributed to the 
peasantry.175 In 1922-1923, yearly imports of textiles into Turkestan were little 
more than one-twentieth of what they had been in 1914, and the recovery was 
very slow: in 1924-1925, imports were still less than one-half of the pre-war 
benchmark.176 In this context, individual weavers and larger workshops sprang 
up to satisfy the local demand for fabric. While data are scant for 1917 and 1918, 
we have quite extensive evidence of this phenomenon for 1919 and the beginning 
of the 1920s. A report from Andijan, dated December 1919, estimated that, in the 
Namangan district alone, the number of weavers had increased from ten to 
twenty-five thousand between August 1918 and August 1919 while the estimate 
for the Fergana province as a whole was between eighty and one hundred 
thousand. Native looms were on sale in the bazaars of Andijan and other major 
cities, together with their accessories. Some of the weavers worked on 
“modernized native looms,” which allowed the production of better quality fabric. 
This textile production – especially cotton weaving – was theoretically illegal 
because (in principle) there existed a monopoly on the purchase of cotton. But 
cotton was on sale in most markets, and the same happened to wool yarn, the 
bazaar price of which had skyrocketed to 200 rubles a pound or more.177 
 The newly established – and still struggling – Bolshevik power in 
Turkestan quickly understood that the nationalized industrial sector of the 
republic would matter; still, in 1921, that sector counted only twenty-one textile 
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workshops (mostly wool and silk), of which seventeen were active, for some 1640 
employees.178 This is why the Bolsheviks in Turkestan were ready to recognize the 
potential of textile craftsmanship for spinning and weaving. Besides their 
usefulness as a reservoir for skilled work and as an audience for the cooperative 
movement, spindlers and, above all, weavers were simply indispensable for the 
local economy to re-start. Hence, in Fergana, institutions of economic 
governance were promoting the diffusion of the aforementioned “modernized 
native looms,” together with the import of a few pieces of more sophisticated 
machinery, like a steam wool cleaner. Building on the model of the local 
craftsmanship, in 1920 the administration planned to constitute “model 
workshops” with a higher level of mechanization, with various degrees of success. 
The wool sector was performing better than cotton, or, at least, the new 
government seemed to grasp it more accurately. Foreign prisoners of war and 
escaped Russian craftsmen (possibly, refugees) in Turkestan were sometimes 
able to operate more sophisticated mechanical textile appliances, in particular 
the Russian kind of “modernized” loom. At the same, in the silk sector, the 
administration strove to recover previous levels of industrial output by 
reconstituting damaged or dispersed capital stock (reels, twisting machines, 
looms). The difficulty of obtaining these pieces of machinery from Russia was 
coupled by the unavailability of raw materials or spun yarn, which Soviet 
economic institutions were unable to obtain, given the low procurement prices 
they could pay to the local producers or spindlers.179  
 
6.2 Shaping the Uzbek industrial landscape  
It was in this context that, in the aftermath of the XI all-Russian Party congress in 
1922, Moscow-based organs in charge of economic policy proposed building 
several light industrial plants in Central Asia and the southern Caucasus. More 
specifically, as noted above, in autumn 1922 the all-Union council of people’s 
commissars was pondering the possibility of building a textile factory in the 
Turkestan republic -- a possibility which the Fergana provincial revolutionary 
committee tried to seize by proposing Fergana (New Margelan) as an ideal venue 
for this enterprise. This did not occur, though.180 Not so dissimilar was the 
The Hunt for Red Orient: A Soviet Industrial trest Between Moscow and Bukhara (1922-1929) 
 
- 66 - 
The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 
http://carlbeckpapers.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/cbp.2016.205 | Number 2406 
 
 
destiny of contemporary plans to pack and physically transfer one (or two?) 
textile plants to the Bukhara People’s Republic: in the end, the BNSR’s trust, 
which became Red Orient, only managed factories in Russian territory. 
 Projects to build a textile mill in Central Asia itself – and in particular in 
the Uzbek SSR – were likely revived only on the eve of the 1924 national 
delimitation, when secondary sources mention the short-lived constitution of a 
Turkestanskaia manufaktura. Given this timing, though, it is likely that Red 
Orient soon absorbed it and that its assets (if any) merged with those assigned to 
the Bukharan people’s republic.181 One year afterwards, though, the Central Asian 
Bureau of the Party acknowledged the construction of two textile factories (one in 
Uzbekistan and the other in Turkmenistan) in the republican economic plans for 
1925-1926. The Bureau endorsed the republic’s motivation for this move, which 
was to shorten the added value chain between raw cotton and cloth.182 In the 
second half of August 1925, Red Orient wished to participate in the construction 
of the factory. In the meantime, the Uzbek VSNKh decided that the plant should 
be located in Fergana, or “New Margelan.” 183  Red Orient's interest in the 
operation initially emerged separately from the republican VSNKh’s decision to 
include the textile factory in its plan, and the involvement of the trust does not 
appear to have been planned at the time: almost one year after these first signs of 
interest, the Presidium of the Uzbek VSNKh was still discussing whether it should 
rely on the trust for the construction of the factory in Fergana, let alone for 
running it.184 This is to say that not only did this Uzbek initiative initially ignore 
Red Orient, but also that, by the summer of 1926, the most basic preparations for 
creating such an industrial endeavor had not even begun. The government was 
proud to announce that the construction of the Fergana textile factory had started 
in 1926 while actually almost nothing took place on the spot before 1928.185 This 
did reflect structural shortcomings: the entire industrial sector of the Uzbek 
republic – which was already scant – was experiencing serious difficulties in 
recovering its pre-war output. In this, it was lagging behind compared to the 
agricultural sector, which had benefitted from substantially more funding, 
especially in the mid-1920s.  
 A report of the republican government to the all-Union VSNKh offered a 
diagnosis of these shortcomings. First of all, the governance of industry (which, 
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after the nationalization of all assets, was in the State’s hands) was inadequate. 
Decisions occurred at the provincial (okrug) level in the local branches of the 
republican VSNKh, which was therefore to blame, for instance, for not yet having 
organized the standard system for allocating long-term industrial loans. In other 
words, even if a few budgetary resources (assignovaniia) were available, they did 
not reach the industrial organizations, or provincial organs used them in ways the 
government described as “uncontrolled, anti-economical, and criminal” 
(bezkontrol’nyi, bezkhoziaistvennyi i prestupnoi).186 Second, and consequently, 
the report noted how financial resources for day-to-day functioning were scarce: 
all enterprises, even the private ones which were renting nationalized assets, had 
to rely upon short-term bank loans, overdrafts, discounts, and the like, which 
were relatively expensive. To cope, they either had to sell their assets on the 
private market or try to differentiate their activity, in the vain hope of earning 
quick cash. An example in this case was a Tashkent-based trust for the 
production of timber, which unsuccessfully embarked on the production of 
pencils, hoping to appeal to the consumer preference for cheap, daily-use goods 
while investments in construction were stagnating.187 It was not only in the textile 
sector, thus, that the government of Soviet Turkestan tolerated and even 
promoted local craftsmanship to satisfy the local demand for consumers’ goods 
even beyond the mid-1920s. Cooperatives and/or work units (arteli) were 
organized in the milling sector, in the production of leather products, and so on. 
For these, throughout the 1920s, the more significant obstacles came not from 
their supposed incompatibility with socialist production but from the inability to 
obtain raw materials.188  
It is true, however, that the industrialization of Uzbekistan figured more 
prominently both in propaganda and on the political agenda. The second party 
conference of the Tashkent province (okrug) passed a resolution in autumn 1927, 
on the basis of a report by Ikramov, which celebrated the supposed first successes 
of the Party in its efforts to develop oil, coal, and textile industries. Even the 
development of technical crops, namely cotton, was regarded as a measure which 
would favor the industrialization of Uzbekistan.189 Decision-makers at all levels 
also attached political and ideological expectations to the recovery of other plants 
which had been originally established before the revolution and then been 
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nationalized, for instance in the silk sector. In the absence of success on that 
front, but because of such urge to deliver results in terms of industrial capacity, 
local officers were obviously tempted to consider semi-artisanal workshops as 
industrial plants. For instance, there were improbable “plans to build four 
weaving factories” in 1927-1928 in the underdeveloped province of Surkhan-
Darya, but these were either long-term goals or a reference to re-vamped large 
weaving workshops.190 
Besides such declarations, however, other documents prove that Uzbek 
Party officers, locally as well as at the highest levels, were aware of the difference 
between establishing a factory and making it produce something. Even more, 
they were painfully aware of how hard it was to reach minimal efficiency or to 
attain the kind of political goals industrial plants were supposed to. For instance, 
in 1929, an inquiry into the Margelan silk factory (the most important of the 
republic, together with the one in Samarkand) revealed that, because of planning 
mistakes, only one-third of the looms were actually operated. Labor came from 
the countryside and was scarcely qualified while the recruitment of women (a 
political imperative in the late 1920s) was regarded as insufficient, despite the 
fact that they made up more than one-third of the total workforce.191 
 
6.3 Building and manning the first textile factory in the Uzbek SSR 
Although we know that no practical step was taken before 1928, officially the 
construction of the Fergana textile factory (Ferganskaia tekstil’naia fabrika) 
started in 1926. Soviet historians use this year as its starting point because it had 
the advantage of symbolizing the recovery of pre-revolutionary output levels in 
agriculture. In 1927, the mill-to-be was dedicated to Feliks Edmundovich 
Dzerzhinskii (former director of VSNKh until 1924 and, above all, head of the 
secret police) on the occasion of his memorial service.192 In other words, the 
factory received a name even before concrete plans for a substantial textile mill, 
and for the textile sector in general, had been produced. This circumstance is 
symptomatic of the great political and symbolic importance of this endeavor. The 
Fergana textile factory was something more than the bricks, mortar, and 
machinery that constituted it and could exist even before their appearance. When 
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the construction was completed and the factory had become Red Orient’s new 
signature business, it was still necessary to recruit qualified textile workers. 
Hence, the physical establishment and practical activity of the factory are 
entangled from the very beginning with its construction as a locus of socialist 
transformation of the region. By the end of the 1920s and until the establishment 
of the Tashkent textile mill in 1932, the social change that such recruitment and 
training embodied (realistically and symbolically) became as important a product 
of the Fergana textile factory as the yarn it spun and the cloth it wove. 
 The material output of the Fergana factory attempted to bring together the 
processes of mechanized production and the taste of Central Asian customers, as 
shaped by the fashion and material culture of the time. Unlike the Boriso-
Lopasnenskaia factory, but similar to the Zaraiskaia, the Fergana factory was, at 
least initially, exclusively devoted to spinning and weaving: the plans did not 
include any department for printing or dyeing. The cloth it produced might have 
been yarn-dyed, but this is unlikely, given the absence of dyeing plants in the 
vicinity. During the first phase, the factory would only weave coarse varieties of 
cloth, such as calico (mitkal’) and the rougher and cheaper biaz’. In that sense, its 
production would complement Red Orient's in the Moscow region where the 
same calicos could be printed and become sitets. In the second phase, the factory 
in Fergana would start producing better cotton fabric, such as cretonne and toile 
de Nor, specifically targeted for the Central Asian market. Unlike the sitets, these 
were thicker and not printed but yarn-dyed, combining a neutral warp with 
colored weft of a variety of colors. This implies that the Ferganskaia fabrika had 
plans to become able to dye its own yarn production, although the 
correspondence does not mention it. On both these kinds of fabric, margins were 
much higher than for the coarser varieties, and they were allegedly more 
palatable for Central Asian consumers. It is likely that Red Orient was indeed 
proposing to produce something similar to the traditional cotton or cotton-and-
silk ikat, based on patterned yarn-dyed warp and often neutral weft. Cretonne 
and toile de Nor would be then used for the visible outer side of traditional 
garments while in Central Asia at that time printed cotton cloth (sitets) usually 
served for inner lining.193 
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As for the process of establishment and construction, it is notable that the 
blueprint for the first textile factory of the Uzbek SSR did not come from the first 
five-year plan but from the regional economic five-year plan for the years 1926-
1927 to 1930-1931. Besides investments in irrigation and agriculture, this plan 
also contained provisions for the development of various branches of industry in 
the Uzbek SSR, sometimes contradicting previous directives. For instance, while 
in 1924 there had been some attempts to close down an important sugar factory 
in Kauchi (Yangi-Yul district, west of Tashkent) and reduce the cultivation of 
sugar beet in the Uzbek SSR, the regional five-year plan ordered that it should 
increase its output and supported expanding the acreage under sugar beet in its 
vicinity.194 This plan constitutes a neglected phase in Soviet development policies 
in Central Asia because some of its provisions did not survive the inauguration of 
the first all-Union five-year plan. This was not, however, the case with the 
Fergana textile factory, which was one of the points of the regional plan that were 
pursued into the first all-Union piatiletka, although not everybody would 
approve the projects for its expansion after 1929. 
 The roadmap for the construction of the Fergana textile factory consisted 
of two phases. Despite some initial hesitation, in November 1928 the first half of 
the plan had been finalized and would start being enacted in June 1929. 195 
According to a very early project, at the beginning the plant would only host ten 
thousand reels and 300 looms. According to a slightly later one, the factory would 
start operating with twenty thousand spindling reels and 600 looms. In both 
versions of the project, in the second phase (as it was initially conceived) the 
factory would reach a total of forty thousand reels and 1200 looms. This second 
phase would start in January 1931.196 Some Uzbek historians, on the basis of 
unknown documents, seem to square the circle by reporting that the phases of 
construction to reach this final result were to be three: the first two, of ten 
thousand reels and 300 looms each; the last, of twenty thousand reels and 600 
looms.197 Another Soviet monograph notes that the factory started its operations 
in 1930 with 906 looms and 19,900 reels.198 This is compatible with the idea that, 
in 1930, the construction process had basically completed its second phase (of 
three -- twenty thousand reels and 600 looms) but that, in view of the third and 
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final phase, the machinery of the weaving compartment was being installed more 
quickly than that of the spindling one, which was lagging behind at this date.  
The factory in Fergana obviously needed sources of energy which were relatively 
hard to find. In this respect, no industrial enterprise in Turkestan would have 
enjoyed the same network externalities as those available to a textile plant in the 
Moscow suburbs. The “new” textile plant had to share its source of energy 
(electric energy, in this case, very likely from kerosene generators) with an “old” 
plant – a cotton-seed oil press of the Cotton Committee. This was meant to be a 
temporary solution: Red Orient looked hopefully to the first five-year plan, 
according to which a hydroelectric power station was to be built on the nearby 
Isfara-Say. Yet the energy the Cotton Committee supplied would indeed have 
been enough to run more than three times the reels and the looms which would 
be there in the first phase.199 One might ask why, in these circumstances, the trust 
did not consider employing workers for three shifts instead of two, at least on 
some of the machinery. In all likelihood, the answer to this question resides in 
the difficulty of recruiting a qualified labor force rather than in the unavailability 
of energy. 
 In December 1928, the VTS approved the first phase, which therefore 
certified its conformity to general all-Union plans for industrial growth in the 
textile sector. The VTS also agreed in principle with the second part of the plan, 
but on the condition that Red Orient find a sufficient number of qualified 
workers to man the additional machinery.200 If the VTS seemed at first reassured 
by what the representative of the Uzbek SSR in Moscow was explaining at the 
beginning of 1929, the Rabkrin continued to have doubts about the opportunity 
to expand the factory to more than forty thousand reels, and the VSNKh seemed 
to follow it on this path.  
But the Uzbek SSR was not only defending its plans around a single 
spinning and weaving plant; it was securing its own share in the development of 
the cotton industry according to the first five-year plan. The stakes were higher 
than what the sheer number of reels or looms might suggest, not only for 
symbolic reasons, but also because the speed of the expansion of textile 
production in these early years was expected to condition further investments. 
Odyli, the Uzbek representative in Moscow, wrote to the Presidium of the all-
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Union VSNKh in April 1929 to defend the target of the five-year plan for his own 
republic (one hundred thousand reels). Quite passionately – Odyli’s past political 
career consisted in his long chairmanship of the Uzbek poor peasants’ (Koshchi) 
league – he refuted the idea that such an increase in production capacity was 
unsustainable; there would be a “pause for reflection” to verify economic results 
in 1930-1931. But at the same time, he was already looking beyond the Fergana 
factory and projecting a scenario for the industrialization of Uzbekistan. Hadn’t 
Rykov himself – he reminded – talked about industrial development in cotton-
growing areas? Hadn’t the “congress of planning workers” itself recognized a gap 
between agricultural and industrial growth in Uzbekistan’s own original 
proposals? To those who wanted Uzbekistan to wait one year, enticing it with the 
bait of more advanced technology, the Uzbek representatives answered that this 
was the case for all the factories in the Union: why should Uzbekistan be singled 
out to be left behind?201 Uzbekistan, Odyli wrote, would not accept being robbed 
of its slice of the cake by other republics: if the all-Union plan forecast an increase 
of 400 thousand reels, and 125 thousand were the share of Transcaucasia, 
nobody could deny an additional one hundred thousand reels over five years to 
the Uzbek SSR.202 
 These were the arguments that Odyli used to defend the “maximalist” 
version of the plan. His opponents in Moscow (the Rabkrin and the VSNKh) 
emphasized the insufficiency of qualified workers and the fact that new 
technology would become available to exclude or delay such expansion. But even 
more revealing are two obvious arguments that each side could have wielded but 
that were, instead, surprisingly neglected. First, Odyli could have noted that, 
without the addition of more reels and looms, the extra energy produced by the 
to-be hydroelectric power station on the Isfara-Say would have been superfluous; 
if the construction of the power station was taken for granted, one had better use 
it for something. In turn, the Rabkrin and the VSNKh could have mentioned that, 
in the first phase, the factory was leaving one-third of its productive potential 
unexploited because of the choice to run the machines on two eight-hour shifts 
only. The Rabkrin and the VSNKh could have asked the trust to run the factory at 
its full capacity and only then ask for extra assets. Even admitting that, in this 
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case, Rabkrin and VSNKh were aware of the difficulty of recruiting and training 
workers, these two arguments remain conspicuous by their absence.  
 This absence is telling of the way decisions about investment were taken, 
in the context of the negotiations between Uzbekistan and Moscow, around the 
five-year plan: with little or no thought to optimize existing assets on one hand -- 
and the inability to consider the relations between two or more items on the 
agenda (here, the textile plant and the hydroelectric power station) on the other. 
This may reflect the “soft budget constraints” so characteristic of the Soviet 
planned economy but also, more generally, the continual struggle around limited 
public resources, which molded investments and, in the end, their returns. Such 
struggle around resources was ultimately more decisive than any single decision 
by either the center or the periphery in shaping the outcomes of economic policy. 
These negotiations were even more crucial on the occasion of the first plan. Odyli 
and the Uzbek government knew that, if they gave up in 1929, their slice of the 
cake, so to say, would be smaller not only in this, but also in all subsequent 
investment plans. 
 Once built and set in motion, the mill needed textile workers – a pretty 
rare species in the Fergana valley and even more so in other parts of the Uzbek 
SSR at the end of the 1920s. Red Orient's connections in European Russia proved 
invaluable here. A first request to use the Zaraiskaia to train Uzbek textile 
workers had been submitted by the Uzbek republican VSNKh as early as 1925 – 
three years before the foundations of the Fergana factory were even laid. By the 
beginning of 1929, the trust had sent 372 Uzbek workers (both men and women) 
to be trained in both its own plants (Zaraiskaia and Boriso-Lopasnenskaia), as 
well as in others in the two major textile districts of Ivanovo-Vosnesensk and Klin 
(north of Moscow), and even in the lair of Red Orient’s former adversary, the 
Egor’evskii trust. 203  The Zaraiskaia factory played the most prominent role. 
Among other things, its machinery was technically similar to the one Uzbek 
apprentice workers would find in the Fergana factory. After completing their 
training in the Zaraiskaia factory, the first contingent of textile workers was sent 
back to Fergana to help with the installation and start-up of the textile machinery 
of the new plant. About three-quarters of them were ready to take on their jobs by 
February 1929.204 The factory was also recruiting Russians and Europeans who 
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had been evacuated to Central Asia during the civil war. Fergana, formerly known 
as New Margelan (or Skobelev), was a city founded in the colonial period with a 
predominantly European population and therefore attracted these sorts of 
migrants, who were then recorded in the unemployment lists. The native workers 
and the European recruits from New Margelan, though, would not have been 
numerous enough to ensure two shifts; this is why two hundred more workers 
would need to be imported from other industrial districts in the USSR.205  
 As even a Soviet celebratory publication could not fail to acknowledge, the 
lack of qualified workers and cadres became dramatically clear as soon as the 
factory started operating, and the situation did not improve quickly. Besides the 
young Uzbeks who had been trained in Russia and the “immigrants,” many 
workers needed to learn the job on the spot. At first, the choice fell on the 
training program known as the “TsIT method” – the acronym referred to the 
Central Labor Institute (Tsentral’nyi Institut Truda in Russian). The results, 
though, were highly disappointing. Not only was the factory operating below its 
full capacity, but the number of working looms was even decreasing: under-
qualified workers often broke them, and it was impossible either to replace or to 
repair them. Spare parts had to be produced locally, sometimes using walnut 
wood rather than metal.206 In October 1930 (less than six months after the 
factory had opened), the organ of the republican communist Party, the 
Uzbekistanskaia Pravda, publicly exposed the scarce productivity of labor, which 
prompted the arrival of more workers and engineers (including some women) 
from the European parts of the Union.207 
 Despite all these shortcomings, the Fergana textile factory was perceived 
as (and to some extent was) the avant-garde of advancing industrial modernity in 
the region: it offered, ideally, emancipation from what the Soviets called “feudal-
patriarchal relics,” especially for women; it created new forms of sociability; it 
dragged Muslim young people from the countryside into an embryo of the 
modern industrial city; and it imposed a regulation of time and organization of 
labor radically opposed to the agricultural cycle and work in the fields. Shortly 
after its opening, the Fergana textile factory was used as the set for the second 
part of an anti-religious propaganda movie, The Girl of the Ishan, in which the 
defiant protagonist (a poor village girl, otherwise destined, because of her father’s 
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superstition, to a future of sexual and social subalternity) buys her ticket to a 
radiant future by learning how to load bobbins of yarn on the weaving loom to 
the implacable rhythm of a metronome (Fig. 3 below).208  
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In sum, the establishment of a weaving factory in the middle of the 
Fergana valley looked like a miniature experiment in Soviet-style social 
engineering: first, because of the inclusion of Uzbek workers, both men and 
women; second, because the training of former Uzbek peasants in the vicinity of 
Moscow surely did not happen without a cultural shock; third, because the 
factory offered a practical solution to an issue – the presence of “idle,” jobless 
Europeans – which constituted a mild threat to public order and was surely 
shameful for the Soviet regime (as, incidentally, the presence of rough, jobless 
settlers had been an embarrassment to the colonial administration of Russian 
Turkestan).209 In these plans, the ethnically European workers from Fergana 
itself were not envisaged as the leaders of some forcible transformation of 
backward Central Asia. If shefstvo rhetoric played a role, it did not concern these 
“poor Whites”; only the supplementary imported European workers would pull 
together and experience the friendship of their Central Asian comrades. As for 
the Central Asian young men and women who lived in Russia to receive training 
there, in the absence of local sources we know very little about their experience 
and the cultural shock it probably involved.210  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The fact that, since 1923, the Bukharan People’s Republic and then the Uzbek 
SSR were managing textile mills in the Moscow region is both intriguing and 
problematic for the student of early Soviet Central Asia. While this is not 
sufficient evidence to state that early Soviet rule in the region considered the 
industrialization of Central Asia a priority, the experience of Red Orient both in 
Russia and later in Fergana shows that this region's participation in Soviet 
industrial modernization was not an unthinkable option in the NEP period or 
even during the first five-year plan. The weight of Red Orient on the total textile 
output of the USSR was very small, as was the share of the Uzbek population that 
was either trained or employed by one of the trust’s plants, including the Fergana 
Textile Factory. The economy of the Uzbek SSR was, and remained, 
predominantly agricultural, and in the 1920s, nobody with authority questioned 
the importance of cotton in it, at least as a rapid way to recover pre-war average 
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living standards. In a way, Red Orient’s emphasis on procuring raw materials 
from Uzbekkhlopok confirmed this. The political and symbolic weight of Red 
Orient was nonetheless much greater, and disproportionate to its assets and 
results, for those who, like Fayzulla Khojaev, harped on it in speeches about the 
state of the economy or, like the Uzbek representative in Moscow, pleaded for it 
in front of the VSNKh to obtain 900 more looms. This disproportion was 
admitted, if not approved, by those who interacted with them about Red Orient at 
the all-Union level; the trust’s “national” nature was a legitimate argument in the 
“wheeling and dealing” that surrounded its activity. The political and symbolic 
weight of Red Orient is also greater than its actual economic importance now, for 
the student of early Soviet Central Asia, as its existence, when taken seriously, 
greatly complicates both the narrative of Bolshevik nationality policy (by adding 
an often neglected economic policy aspect to it) and the standard narrative that 
sees Soviet rule, in any time and at all levels, as fostering the de-industrialization 
and the dependency of the region. The story of Red Orient cannot, on its own, 
lead to a new overarching interpretation. It tells us little, for instance, about the 
theoretical and practical debates about economic planning and cotton 
monoculture in Central Asia throughout the 1920s. Yet to include Red Orient and 
other “deviant” episodes in the picture may suggest a more nuanced and 
empirically-based interpretation for future research. 
 We can view the story of Red Orient, its creation, and its relations with 
other economic actors (producers, consumers, governing bodies) in the NEP 
period from two different standpoints: that of the business historian or that of the 
student of modern Russian (and then Soviet) Central Asia or of the USSR in 
general. The first option is risky because of the dearth of business history 
literature on the Soviet Union and, a fortiori, on its non-European regions. The 
second is more conventional, especially insofar one chooses to focus on Bolshevik 
nationality policy and “center-periphery” relations throughout the 1920s. 
 The story of Red Orient shows to what extent the activity of the latter as a 
state (and even more as a “national”) trust went beyond simple production, here 
to be understood as the physical transformation of raw materials into 
commodities through the application of capital and labor. In this respect, 
Vladislav Todorov’s statement holds true for Red Orient and many other Soviet 
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industrial conglomerates: the trust was undoubtedly producing a “united-
working-class-body” at least as much as it was turning yarn into cloth or printing 
“Asian-style patterns” on fabric. This was not only the case of the in vivo 
experiment of social engineering at the Fergana textile factory; one could see it 
also in Beliakov’s political arguments when he pointed at workers’ barracks, 
training facilities, and orphanages, as if these constituted the most important 
“output” of the Zaraiskaia factory under his management. It was also evident in 
the fact that the Fergana textile factory, Red Orient’s latest core business, was 
baptized after Dzerzhinskii, before its construction (let alone its production) had 
even started. Above all, the rhetoric, as well as the practice, of molding the 
“united-working-class-body” lay at the very foundation of the idea to assign to the 
Bukharan people’s republic a handful of industrial plants and to enable the 
government of this “allied” republic to set up a state trust for their management. 
Thus, it made little difference if the factories were located on Bukharan territory, 
in the Riazan’ guberniia, or even within the city boundaries of Moscow; 
symbolically and practically, these factories belonged to Bukhara (later, to the 
Uzbek SSR) and represented its inclusion in the general economy of the USSR 
even before the “national” delimitation of Central Asia had been completed. 
Moreover, Red Orient and its assets embodied the compact with the Bukharan 
pro-Bolshevik elites which made up its “council of nazirs.” Allowing them to 
“own” a couple of textile mills meant that those new comrades from the East 
could experiment in economic planning while calling for help from the all-Union 
Rabkrin in case something went wrong. Finally, the Zaraiskaia and other 
factories also exemplified the possible destiny of the “Red Orient” they were 
named after, both within the USSR and immediately beyond its boundaries. 
 Nonetheless, at least in one respect, Red Orient failed to realize this 
integration into the ideal “united-working-class-body”: if it managed to 
transform some Uzbek rural dwellers into industrial workers, it probably failed to 
turn them into consumers of their own manufactured goods. Although Beliakov 
and others argued for the need to supply the Central Asian cotton-growing 
peasantry, it seems that Red Orient’s Muscovite factories never adapted their 
output to meet their Uzbekistani costumers’ preferences and only later managed 
to set up expedient links with local economic organizations for the distribution of 
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their own manufactured goods. The focus on cretonne and toile de Nor (the 
closest equivalents to local ikats) as future products of the new Fergana textile 
factory also came quite late, after the end of the NEP period, and even then this 
was more a project than a practical achievement. Between 1922 and 1929, Red 
Orient was a Bukharan, and then Uzbek, trust that catered to a mostly European 
audience – an audience that probably contented itself with hints of the Soviet 
“Orient” in stylized “Asian-style patterns.”  
 The failure to establish a link between Red Orient and the reality on the 
ground in the Uzbek SSR existed both on the demand and the supply sides. In 
other words, not only did Red Orient not work for Uzbek consumers; its 
purchases of ginned cotton did not reflect any special bond between the 
Zaraiskaia factory and local procurements. In this respect, the difficult relations 
with the Bukharan state trade organization (Bukhgostorg) in the first years are 
symptomatic, as they reflect the shortcomings of both the former and the latter in 
the two directions of their business relations. The attempt to set up a special link 
with Uzbekkhlopok was equally unsuccessful. Beyond all rhetoric, Red Orient was 
never a fully “national” enterprise. This does not mean, however, that Red 
Orient’s story fits easily in the paradigmatic interpretation according to which the 
1920s consisted of an initial trend towards “decolonization,” followed by 
increasing “centralization.” This paradigm works very well for some events: the 
land reform of 1920-1922 was a self-aware form of “decolonization,” and 
historians are right in highlighting how the republic lost control of water 
management around 1927. 211  In the case of Red Orient, one could indeed 
interpret the trust's constitution as a “decolonization” measure, or at least a 
gesture in this direction for the Bukharan “national communists.” Yet, from 1926, 
the decision to build the Fergana textile factory and its implementation cannot be 
easily read as forms of “centralization.” The same holds true for the fact that Red 
Orient glided unscathed through the VTS’s “syndicalization” offensive at least 
until the end of the NEP period.  
I argue, first, that Red Orient's experience between 1922 and 1929 shows 
that, in the NEP period, a variety of actors could play the “national” card with 
some hope of success in negotiating with the “center” of the USSR. That they did 
not always succeed (but wasn’t the mere survival of Red Orient against all odds a 
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success?) does not make the “national” card less important. What matters is that 
many actors behaved as if this was a rational strategy. Second, I contend that, in 
the case of the Uzbek SSR (and Turkestan and the BNSR before it), this 
negotiation and its outcomes underpinned a model of development from which 
industry (and the textile industry in particular) was not excluded from the 
beginning, although this situation started changing at the beginning of the first 
all-Union five-year plan (as distinct from previous plans for the regional 
economy). Third, and last, I would recall that this situation did not imply the 
rejection of plans to recover and expand the cultivation of cotton in Soviet 
Central Asia; these plans benefitted from the secondment of local “national” 
politicians. 
 The fact that the Bukharan and Uzbek governments could play on the 
“national” nature of Red Orient was a sub-species of a more general 
phenomenon. Throughout the history of this trust, considerations and 
mechanisms pertaining to politics (more than to policy-making) became relevant 
for its economic activity. For instance, the 1923-1924 balance sheet did not only 
reflect the income-producing activity of the trest in that year; negotiations 
between organizations (from the management of Red Orient to the all-Union 
VSNKh, to the Rabkrin) shaped it at least as much as the actual flow of resources 
and output. Similarly, the Uzbek government's intervention in the STO 
arbitration between Red Orient and the Egor’evskii trust, which the commission 
considered no more than ordinary administration, highlighted the political 
dimension of industrial activity. In a liberal context, state institutions define the 
norms and provide institutions for dispute settlement and contract enforcement. 
Here, some of the many segments of the Soviet state system intervened as parts 
of the dispute, or as negotiators on behalf of theoretically autonomous industrial 
organizations. The more a bureaucratic system is complicated, the more it leaves 
niches where specific interests can be voiced and put forward.212 “Wheeling and 
dealing,” as Shearer puts it, was possible and handy (though not always 
successful or efficient), when state institutions acted both as referees and players, 
depending on the circumstances. 
 This context molded Red Orient's difficult relations with other businesses 
and with factor markets more specifically. Even beyond the cost of recruiting 
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qualified labor for the Fergana textile factory, it appears that Red Orient was 
constantly the victim of an inadequate market for capital – in the sense of credit, 
instrumental goods, and circulating capital. As far as the first was concerned, the 
trust was not only systematically undercapitalized; it had inescapable difficulties 
managing its cash-flow and had to rely on trade credit and subcontracting to 
avoid monetary outlays to obtain raw materials. Second, the case of the 900 
looms of the Boriso-Lopasnenskaia factory demonstrates how, in the NEP 
period, it was not enough to want to buy instrumental goods, and pay for them, to 
secure them. Third, the difficulties Red Orient (and indeed its partners) 
experienced in securing grey cloth, yarn, and ginned cotton, with the consequent 
bottlenecks and suboptimal use of machinery, demonstrate to what extent factors 
of production may have been allocated on the basis of bureaucratic mechanisms 
already before the advent of the full-scale planned economy.  
 The Bukharan, then Uzbek, trust demonstrated some ingenuity in its 
search for solutions to survive, if not thrive. Trade “on the side” was one of them; 
subcontracting was another. But the most interesting solution was the attempt to 
integrate several steps of the textile added-value chain “vertically” by acquiring 
the Blagushinskaia and other factories. In the terminology of industrial 
organization which O.E. Williamson introduced,213 Red Orient reacted to the 
under-development of the market (both for factors and for final products) with a 
move towards hierarchy. This strategy did not work, partly because of the lack of 
economic viability of some of these decisions: factories had to be restored, 
machinery had to be repaired, and so on. Partly, though, it failed because of the 
opposition of Moscow-based regional and all-Union organs (MSNKh, Rabkrin). 
The Rabkrin, the VSNKh, and the MSNKh can hardly be seen as antitrust 
authorities opposing Red Orient’s integration strategy; they seem to have acted 
on the basis of very different considerations, and they did not, as a rule, oppose 
the same move in the case of other trusts. In the end, Red Orient remained 
focused on spinning and weaving (in Zaraisk and Fergana) and, to a lesser extent, 
on printing (in the Veniukovskaia factory) while it ultimately discarded dyeing, 
mercerizing, and twisting. To some degree, it ended up preferring functional 
specialization to vertical integration, at most playing the card of diversifying its 
textile products. It is interesting, though, that Red Orient (as well as Soviet 
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organs of economic governance) did not reject the model of the traditional cotton 
mill, devoted to both spinning and weaving, and explicitly reproduced it in the 
plans for the Fergana textile factory.  
 It is uncertain to what extent Red Orient's experience can be generalized. 
It is particularly regrettable that we lack studies of other “national” trusts, as well 
as of single industries in the non-European republics of the USSR in the same 
period. Until such a corpus of scholarship is built, one hesitates to extend these 
conclusions on Red Orient’s achievement, shortcomings, and industrial strategy 
to other industrial or proto-industrial activities. Similarly, we do not yet know 
whether the relation between Bukhara (later, Samarkand) and organs of 
economic governance in Moscow was the same as between the latter and, say, 
Baku or Tbilisi. This case-study is itself an invitation to take local experiences, 
individual cases, and chronological distinctions into account when examining the 
history of non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union.  
 Yet the vicissitudes of Red Orient demonstrate the interest of a history of 
business and accounting practices in the crucial early years of the Soviet Union. 
The relevance of private initiative during NEP, the political or neutral nature of 
Soviet auditing, and the process of “syndicalization” that led to wholesale 
planning (just to mention a few) are issues that we can better grasp by looking at 
management practices and decisions within each trust, or enterprise, than by 
limiting ourselves to the chronicle of Soviet legislation or administrative 
measures on industry, normalization of bookkeeping, and so on. In addition, the 
story of Red Orient (and that, less known, of Turkmenmanufaktura) casts light 
on what one could call the “economic side” of Bolshevik nationalities policy and 
nativization (korenizatsiia): learning how to administer a trust (whose factories 
happened to be located in the Moscow region) was, in a way, a form of 
praktikanstvo, an opportunity for the “natives” (or, more exactly, a few of them) 
to learn some policy-making and management skills.214 This was even truer for 
the training of the first generation of Uzbekistani textile workers, a real, albeit 
small, avant-garde of the national proletariat worth depicting as a social model in 
propaganda movies. While it is impossible to gauge what would have happened if 
such an involvement and training had not taken place, it is quite sure that, from 
Fayzulla Khodjaev’s viewpoint down to that of the young workers in their Zaraisk 
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dormitories, Red Orient was meant to represent (and to some extent was) a 
foundational experience of what the rule of Soviet Moscow on Central Asia 
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krasil’no-appreturnaia i krutil’naia; the second term refers in Russian to any finishing 
process (for yarn or fabric), but because here it is used in conjunction with “dyeing” and 
“twisting,” it is a safe guess to think that finishing concerns the yarn, and mercerization 
was the most common yarn finishing process for cotton in Russia since the late 1890s. 
But see also: rent contract of the Blagushinskaia mekhanichesko-tkatskaia i krasil’naia 
fabrika [April 1926], TsGAMO, f. 1567, op. 5, d. 47. 
86. Rabkrin to the BNSR government and to the trade and industry nazir, Ataev, June 
28, 1924, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 201, ll. 30-33. 
87. Rent contracts [April 1926] and February 29, 1928, TsGAMO, f. 1567, op. 5, d. 47, ll. 
3, 64, 78-79. There is the possibility, of course, that Krasnyi Vostok was renting only one 
section of the factory. 
88. Doklad o rezul’tatakh…, cited, here l. 6ob; also: Zakliuchenie PRK, cit., here l. 11ob. 
The latter plant was located in the village of Zubovo, on the bank of the Lutosnia river. It 
was originally founded in 1837. See: http://xn--h1addj.xn--p1ai/gorod/story/ [last 
viewed November 7, 2012]. Someone has posted a photo of the factory as it looks now: 
http://foto-planeta.com/photo/128998.html [same as above]. 
89. Ibid. (mentioning five sovkhozy, two more mills within them, and an additional brick 
factory); five sovkhozy “owned” by the trest also according to: Commission for the 
registration of the patrimony of Krasnyi Vostok, February 20, 1925, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, 
d. 200, ll. 1-2, here l. 2; see also: Kratkoe soderzhanie iz doklada po obsledovaniu 
Krasnogo Vostoka, [after January 1925], GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 441, ll. 1-4, here l. 3.  
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90. Doklad o rezul’tatakh obsledovaniia Bukharskogo promyshlennogo predpriiatia 
priadil’noi-tkatskoi manufaktury “Krasnyi Vostok” [end of 1924-January 1925], GARF, 
f. 374, op. 12, d. 441, ll. 5-14, here ll. 5-6. 
91. Protokol, Presidium UzVSNKh, August 21, 1925, RGAE, f. 3429, op. 3, d. 1079, ll. 7-9, 
here l. 7. 
92. For all this part, see: Doklad o rezul’tatakh obsledovaniia Bukharskogo 
promyshlennogo predpriiatia priadil’noi-tkatskoi manufaktury “Krasnyi Vostok” [end 
of 1924-January 1925], GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 441, ll. 5-14, here ll. 5-6. 
93. Barry M. Richman, Management Development and Education in the Soviet Union 
(East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1967), 9-10, 45-47. 
94. We know very little about A.A. Beliakov, besides his management style (see below) 
and the fact that he had been a party member since 1894: GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 201, l. 
59. 
95. Among others, see: Kangas, Faizulla Khodzhaev, 137. 
96. Information from the online edition of the biographical dictionary compiled by Sh. 
Kadyrov, on the basis of: RGASPI f. 62, op. 4, d. 700, l. 55, 
http://www.centrasia.ru/person2.php?&st=1096055757 [last seen on May 14, 2011]. 
Fayzulla Khojaev alluded to the purge in the second part of his account of the revolution 
in Bukhara, justified it with the above mentioned “surge of capitalist elements,” leading 
to “the corruption of the top of our [State] apparatus,” and explained that the 
administration of the Bukharan economy had improved with the arrival of Soviet 
specialists borrowed from Tashkent: “K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare i natsional’nogo 
razmezhevaniia v Srednei Azii” (2nd ed., 1926) Izbrannye trudy v trëkh tomakh, t. 1, 
Tashkent, “Fan,” 1970, pp. 71-308, here p. 242. For more information on the purge itself, 
I am indebted to Adeeb Khalid (private email communication, December 2, 2013). See 
also: Khalid, “Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic,” p. 358. As for the alternation in the 
management of Krasnyi Vostok, though, a third source suggests that Beliakov lost his 
position only at a later date in 1925, as a consequence of one Rabkrin inquiry and that he 
was not replaced by Ata-Khojaev Pulatovich but by a tandem made up of a Bukharan 
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(Sattar Khojaev) and a Russian Jew (Rappoport), on which see below. See: anonymous 
letter to the Rabkrin, counterfeited handwriting, [late 1925?], GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 
200, l. 103. 
97. Balance sheet for the year 1924-1925 (closed October 1, 1925), GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 
200, ll. 139-145. 
98. The report mentioned biaz’ (uncolored rough calico) and tik (thick cloth, typically 
used for mattresses and other sturdy covers): chair of the revision commission, doklad, 
March 20, 1924, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 201, ll. 2-27, here l. 2. 
99. This is a possible reference to twisting and possibly mercerization, dyeing, or 
bleaching: hence the supposed strategic importance of the Blagushinskaia fabrika 
mentioned above: Ibid., here l. 11. 
100. Ibid., l. 17, cit. l. 2. 
101. President of the Rabkrin permanent revision commission (Udal’) to the komfraktsia 
of Krasnyi Vostok [late spring 1924], GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 201, ll. 39-41, both cit. l. 41. 
102. Chair of the revision commission, doklad, March 20, 1924, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 
201, ll. 2-27, here l. 17. The expression u Khrista za pazukhoi could also be rendered as 
“He feels as if he were God’s gift” – it implies a sense of entitlement, not only of 
beatitude. 
103. Indeed, the word dumping had already been assimilated by the Russian language, at 
least since the first decade of the century. For instance, this term was used in the press to 
designate the behavior of Knoop’s companies on the market of textile goods in 1909: V. 
Shimanovskii, “Khlopchatobumazhnyi coup d’état,” TPG, 1909, in Turkestanskii sbornik 
505: 1-3. 
104. Biuro registratsii vnebirzhevykh sdelok, Moscow Stock Exchange, to NKRKI, 
Torgovaya inspektsiia, May 9, 1924, GARF, f. 374, op. 28, d. 376, ll. 1-2. 
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105. Doklad o rezul’tatakh obsledovaniia Bukharskogo promyshlennogo predpriiatia 
priadil’noi-tkatskoi manufaktury “Krasnyi Vostok” [end of 1924-January 1925], GARF, 
f. 374, op. 12, d. 441, ll. 5-14, here l. 5. 
106. Ibid., here l. 6ob. 
107. Ibid., here l. 13. 
108. Ibid., here l. 9. 
109. Ibid., here l. 10. 
110. Fayzulla Khodzhaev, “Khoziaistvennoe polozhenie Uzbekskoi SSR i perspektivy ego 
razvitiia,” in Izbrannye trudy, t. II, Tashkent, Izdatel’stvo “Fan” Uzbekskoi SSR, 1972, 
pp. 11-62, here p. 43 (original ed. Tashkent, UzGIz, 1925). This document erroneously 
calls the Blaguchinskaia factory “Blagoustenskaia.” 
111. Chair of the inspection commission, doklad, March 20, 1924, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 
201, ll. 2-27, here ll. 10ob, 13-13ob, 8. 
112. Chair of the inspection commission, doklad, March 20, 1924, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 
201, ll. 2-27, here ll. 10ob, 13-13ob, 8. 
113. Beliakov to NKRKI (Kuibyshev) and Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), Dokladnaia zapiska, 
April 26, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 28, d. 1396, ll. 3-22, here l. 13. 
114. Beliakov’s behavior (in particular the fact that he opposed Ata-Khojaev to Fayzulla 
Khojaev) and the turnover in the Bukharan “supervisors” of Red Orient in Moscow may 
even suggest the existence of political transactions around this trust within such 
Bukharan leadership. This, however, cannot be demonstrated by the documents I have 
had access to. 
115. Beliakov, reporting the estimate of the Tax Commission of the Moscow oblast’: 
Beliakov to NKRKI (Kuibyshev) and Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), Dokladnaia zapiska, April 
26, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 28, d. 1396, ll. 3-22, here l. 13. 
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116. This is what Beliakov said the Rabkrin auditors had estimated: Beliakov to NKRKI 
(Kuibyshev) and Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), Dokladnaia zapiska, April 26, 1926, GARF, f. 
374, op. 28, d. 1396, ll. 3-22, here l. 6. 
117. Version approved by the Presidium VSNKh, January 21,1926, published in TPG, no. 
35, February 12, 1923, p. 4. 
118. Zakliuchenie PRK po balansu pravlenia tresta Kizil-Shark na 1-e oktiabria 1925g., 
March 23, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 208, ll. 10-37. 
119. Beliakov, reporting the estimate of the Tax Commission of the Moscow oblast’: 
Beliakov to NKRKI (Kuibyshev) and Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), Dokladnaia zapiska, April 
26, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 28, d. 1396, ll. 3-22, here l. 13. 
120. A balance sheet can be compared to a snapshot of the situation at the end of the 
economic year; an income statement reflects the difference between the situation at the 
beginning and at the end of the year. The first shows “stocks”; the second shows “flows.” 
121. Zakliuchenie Ugproma UzVSNKh po otchetu Krasnogo Vostoka 1923-4 g., [late 
1925 or early 1926], GARF, f. 374, op. 28, l. 1396, ll. 23-42, here ll. 26-30. 
122.Beliakov to NKRKI (Kuibyshev) and Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), Dokladnaia zapiska, 
April 26, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 28, d. 1396, ll. 3-22, here l. 4. 
123. Version approved by the Presidium VSNKh, 21.1.1926, published in TPG, no. 35, 
February 12, 1923, p. 4. 
124. Because there is no precise information about the single sections of the previous 
versions, it is hard to say how this result was achieved. It seems that the new managers 
slightly eroded the liabilities side, for instance by subtracting some seven thousand 
rubles from the provisions. The assets side also grew by eleven percent, possibly by 
revising the estimate of the circulating capital upwards. Compare: TPG, no. 35, February 
12, 1923, p. 4; and: Zakliuchenie Ugproma UzVSNKh po otchetu Krasnogo Vostoka 
1923-4 g. [late 1925 or early 1926], GARF, f. 374, op. 28, l. 1396, ll. 23-42, here ll. 26-30. 
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125. This was embedded in a document by the Party’s Revision Commission (which 
monitored and, on occasions, corrected the Rabkrin’s decisions) dated March 1926; it 
showed perfect budget parity at the end of 1923-1924. The assets and liabilities 
amounted both to some 7,844,218 rubles, compared to 8,809,557 for the assets in the 
official published version. To reach perfect parity, assets had slightly diminished (in 
particular the estimation of machinery and buildings, and commercial and documentary 
credit) while, on the liabilities side, the working capital was increased by around nine 
percent. All this looked, once again, strangely artificial. The purpose of this document 
seems to have been limited to the comparison of economic results between the years 
1923-1924 and 1924-1925, when nobody doubted the existence of a small income of 
60,641 rubles. See: Zakliuchenie PRK po balansu pravlenia tresta Kizil-Shark na 1-e 
oktiabria 1925g., March 23,1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 208, ll. 10-37. 
126. Anonymous letter to the Rabkrin [1926], GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 856, l. 103. Note 
the use of the word “Narkomfin” to express what should have been “nazirat finansov.” 
Besides the counterfeited handwriting, this letter was also written in poor Russian. 
127. Materials in: GARF, f. 374, op. 28, d. 203. This delo is included in the materials of 
the Rabkrin inspection to Krasnyi Vostok. “Financial Administration” (Finansovoe 
Upravlenie) may be a clumsy translation for the “finance nazirat.” For information 
about Sattar Khojaev, I thank Adeeb Khalid (private email communication, December 2, 
2013). 
128. Mostrikotazh, which was meant to receive the Blagushinskaia fabrika, was refusing 
to pay for the machinery; MSNKh had to mediate the transfer of the Zubovskaia fabrika 
to Rosstovar because the repair work was exceedingly expensive: Krasnyi Vostok [?] to 
UzVSNKh, report [summer 1925, but before August 1925], GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 440, 
ll. 1-35, here ll. 4-5. 
129. Advertisement for Krasnyi Vostok’s yarn, TPG, no. 12, January 15, 1925, p. 6. 
130. Commission on the trading activity of Krasnyi Vostok, report [after October 1925], 
GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 440, ll. 105-105ob. 
132. SNK UzSSR to STO SSSR, September 13, 1926, GARF, f. 5674, op. 6, d. 974, l. 2. 
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133. VSNKh uzSSR to NKRKI UzSSR, October 6, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 856, l. 5; 
compare: Zakliuchenie PRK po balansu pravlenia tresta Kizil-Shark na 1-e oktiabria 
1925g., March 23, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 208, ll. 10-37, here ll. 11-11ob. 
134. From a Krasnyi Uzbekistan advertisement, TPG, no. 27, February 3, 1925, p. 6.  
135. Krasnyi Vostok to UzVSNKh, report, [summer 1925, before August 1925], GARF, f. 
374, op. 12, d. 440, ll. 1-35, here l. 7. 
136. Presidium UzVSNKh, protokol, no. 20, April 25, 1928, RGAE, f. 3429, op. 3, d. 
2096, ll. 182-189, here l. 183. 
137. Shearer, “Wheeling and Dealing.” 
138. Spravka on AKSTO’s deliberation [before July 1925], GARF, f. 5574, op. 5, d. 1309, 
ll. 11-13; STO, excerpt from the protokol, no. 166, July 22, 1925, Ibid., l. 14. 
139. The problem the commission had to rule on concerned the value of the yarn which 
Red Orient had sold at credit to the Egor’evskii trest: the latter claimed that it had paid 
more than it owed; Red Orient disagreed. The commission’s decision, on the other hand, 
could not touch upon the issue of the failure to pay its shares by the Egor’evskii trest: 
Decision of the AKSTO, November 19, 1925, GARF, f. 5474, f. 6, d. 1807, ll. 8-12; 
permanent representative of the Uzbek SSR to STO, January 16, 1926, Ibid., ll. 1-2; 
AKSTO to STO, January 25, 1926, Ibid., ll. 4-5; Egor’evskii Trest to STO, February 25, 
1926, Ibid., l. 14; AFK (Administrative-Financial Commission), excerpt from the 
protokol, April 22, 1926, Ibid., l. 19. Even before the final decision, Red Orient had 
already decided to comply.  
140. Exactly at the same time (March to May 1926), the AFK and the STO were 
considering two other issues pertaining to the Uzbek republican budget. In both cases, 
the Uzbek SSR seems to have benefitted from a direct communication line with the 
deputy chair of the STO, Kuibyshev: see documents in GARF, f. 5446, op. 7, d. 75; f. 
5446, op. 7a, d. 430, esp. l. 14. It is possible that the three cases were considered “in a 
bundle” by STO organs, and maybe a bargain arranged with Samarkand, but no evidence 
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of either can be found in the archives – at any rate, those paralegal arrangements would 
have left no paper trail. 
141. See: Penati, “Le Comité du Coton et les autres.” 
142. Krasnyi Vostok to UzVSNKh, report [summer 1925, before August 1925], GARF, f. 
374, op. 12, d. 440, ll. 1-35, here ll. 23-24. 
143. Krasnyi Vostok to UzVSNKh, November 23, 1925, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 440, ll. 
110-113. 
144. See Penati, “Le Comité du Coton.” 
145. Vypiska iz protokola, SNK SSSR, October 18, 1926; GARF, f. 5674, op. 6, d. 974, l. 7; 
presidium VSNKh SSSR to STO, September 28, 1926, Ibid., l. 4; vypiska iz protokola, 
STO SSSR, November 5, 1926, Ibid., l. 8. 
146. Rabkrin, Dokladnaia zapiska on the execution of the Kollegiia NKRKI of June 11, 
1925, April 20, 1926, GARF, f. 374, op. 12, d. 856, ll. 9-11.  
147. From a Krasnyi Uzbekistan advertisement, TPG, no. 27, February 3, 1925, p. 6. 
148. Krasnyi Vostok to UzVSNKh, report [summer 1925, before August 1925], GARF, f. 
374, op. 12, d. 440, ll. 1-35, here l. 10. 
149. Penati, “Le Comité du Coton.” 
150. Krasnyi Vostok to UzVSNKh, report [summer 1925, before August 1925], GARF, f. 
374, op. 12, d. 440, ll. 1-35, here l. 15. 
151. Krasnyi Vostok to UzVSNKh, report [summer 1925, before August 1925], GARF, f. 
374, op. 12, d. 440, ll. 1-35, here l. 15. 
152. Krasnyi Vostok to uzVSNKh (Khamutkhanov, chair), January 7, 1926, GARF, f. 374, 
op. 12, d. 440, ll. 90-91. 
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153. SNK UzSSR to STO SSSR, September 13, 1926, GARF, f. 5674, op. 6, d. 974, l. 2. 
154. “Torgovaya deiatel’nost’ tresta ‘Kizil-Shark’,” TPG, no. 115(1249), May 22, 1926, p. 4. 
155. “Eshche o treste ‘Kzyl-Shark,’” TPG, no. 119(1253), May 27, 1926, p. 4; “Dostizhenia 
tresta ‘Kzyl-Shark’”, TPG, no. 184(1318), August 14, 1926, p. 3. 
156. “Sinditsirovanie sbyta khl.-bum. tkanei,” TPG, no. 250(1384), October 30, 1926, p. 
4. 
162. Left: TPG, no. 12, January 15, 1925, p. 6; right: TPG, no. 27, February 3, 1925, p. 6. 
Note that, in the first advertisement, Krasnyi Vostok is still “Bukharan” despite the 
completion of the national delimitation. This circumstance, together with the presence, 
in its management, of “recycled” elements from the pre-1923 BNSR government, is 
suggestive of the special links between this venture and Bukharan mercantile and 
political circles, rather than of a link with the Uzbek SSR as such. 
157. “Obrabotka khlopka tekstil’noi promyshlennost’iu,” TPG, no. 46(1180), February 25, 
1926, p. 3. 
158. See for instance: intervention by Dunaev (chairman of the UzGosplan), in Pervyi 
vseuzbekskii s’ezd sovetov rabochikh, dehkanskikh, i krasnoarmeiskikh deputatov 
UzSSR. Stenograficheskii otchët [February 1925], Tashkent, Uzbekskoe 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1925, here p. 43. 
159. Rozental’ (representative of the UzSSR to the all-Union government) to the 
Presidium VSNKh, June 12, 1926, RGAE, f. 3429, op. 3, d. 1081, l. 3; note for Kviring 
(president of VSNKh SSSR), to be forwarded to Rozental’, June 29, 1926, Ibid., l. 5; trest 
“Kzyl Shark,” VSNKh of the UzSSR, to the “National policy department” [sic], VSNKh 
SSSR, July 21, 1926, Ibid., ll. 1-2. Incidentally, “900 looms” was probably an 
exaggeration because in mid-1921 the factory only contained forty looms and a 20 HP 
engine; it may be that the higher count yielded by the Uzbeks included obsolete 
machinery that had been discarded even before 1921. See: Ezhemesiachnye blanki for 
the Boriso-Lopasnenskaia fabrika, 1921, TsGAMO, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 2515, esp. ll. 1, 7. 
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160. Rozental’ (representative of the UzSSR to the all-Union government) to Presidium 
VSNKh, June 12, 1926, RGAE, f. 3429, op. 3, 1081, l. 3. 
161. Emmanuil Ionovich Kviring (1888-1937), from 1923 to 1925 first secretary of the 
Ukrainian communist party, between 1927 and 1931 was the deputy chair of the all-
Union Gosplan. In this capacity, he also dealt with the ex post accounts for the land 
reform in Uzbekistan (1925-1926). Shot in 1937, he was rehabilitated in 1956. 
163. “Torgovaya deyatel’nost’ tresta ‘Kizil-Shark,”’ TPG, no. 115(1249), May 22, 1926, p. 
4. 
164. Indeed, Krasnyi Vostok kept asking for the looms in the Summer of 1926: report, 
Trest « Kzyl Shark », VSNKh of the UzSSR, to the “National policy department” [sic], 
VSNKh SSSR, July 21, 1926, Ibid., ll. 1-2. 
165. “Eshche o treste ‘Kzyl-Shark,’” TPG, no. 119(1253), May 27, 1926, p. 4; “Dostizhenia 
tresta ‘Kzyl-Shark’,’ TPG, no. 184(1318), August 14, 1926, p. 3. 
166. The trest Krasnyi Vostok, however, was not explicitly mentioned: “Ukrupnenie 
khlopchato-bumazhnykh trestov,” TPG, no. 142(1276), June 25, 1926, p. 3. 
167. Information from the webpage of the city of Chekhov: http://www.chekhov-
town.ru/history.php [last seen on April 5, 2011]. 
168. Ispolbiuro TsK KP(b)Uz, protokol no. 73, March 6, 1927, RGASPI, f. 17 op. 27, f. 10, 
ll. 57-58. 
169. This distinction is important in the discussion of de-industrialization in India, 
where Tirthankar Roy has thoroughly demonstrated the importance of small industry 
and “labor-intensive industrialization.” For a brief introduction, see: T. Roy, The 
Economic History of India, 1857-1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006),190-
192 (with bibliography). On Central Asia, we have: Skallerup, Artisans between Guilds 
and Cooperatives. See also the works mentioned in note 4. Precious information on 
craftsmanship, its cultural-religious implications, and the identity of craftsmen 
themselves can be found in Jeanine E. Dağyeli, Gott liebt das Handwerk: Moral, 
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Identität und religiöse Legitimierung in der Mittelasiatischen Handwerks-risâla 
(Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag 2011).  
170. This is what Thompstone’s influential article seems to imply by saying that “a 
modern textile industry in Turkestan ... was banned”: Thompstone, “Russian 
Imperialism,” 251. 
171. Promyshlennost’ Uzbekistana, pp. 6, 81; Ibragimdzhan Iskanderov, Tekstil’naia 
promyshlennost’ Uzbekistana, Tashkent, Izdatel’stvo “Uzbekistan,” 1974, p. 22. Cf. 
Thompstone, “Russian Imperialism,” 254. 
172. See in particular: Veksel’mann, Rossiiskii monopolisticheskii i inostrannyi kapital, 
p. 129. When referring to this passage, Thompstone (“Russian Imperialism,” 54) does 
not make it clear that the problem was that the investors were foreigners, not that they 
were interested in industry.  
173. S.K. Zhakupbekov, Pervaia fabrika Kazakhstana (istoriia Kargalinskogo 
sukonnogo kombinata), Alma-Ata, “Kazakhstan,” 1989; V.V. Zaorskaia – K.A. 
Aleksander, Promyshlennye zavedenia Turstanskogo kraia, Vyp. 1, Petrograd, 
Ekaterinskaia tipografiia, 1915, pp. 334-335. 
174. Protokol soveshchaniia po voprosu o poluchenii khlopka iz Turkestana i o 
snabzhenii Turkestana khlebom i manufakturoi, January 24, 1919, GARF, f. 7659, op. 1, 
d. 191, ll. 29-31. 
175. Radiogram, Rudzutak, Katkyn, Matveev to Rykov, Tsiurupa (NKProd), Nogin 
(Glavtekstil’), [February 1920], RGASPI, f. 122, op. 1, d. 95, l. 107.  
176. Telegram, Briukhanov (deputy NKProd) to Turkkomprod [April 1920?], RGASPI, f. 
12, op. 1, d. 95, l. 130. 
177. V.A. Suvorov, Turkestanskaia ASSR nakanune vosstanovite’nogo perioda, 
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